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THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE MODERN LAW OF RESERVATIONS: 
THE DOCTRINAL GENEALOGY OF GENERAL COMMENT NO. 24 
 
Akbar Rasulov
*
 
 
 
Method, then, is distinguished by the fact that it outlives the 
case for which it was developed. It can become 
autonomous, so to speak; one can abstract method from the 
motivating causes as well as formalize and generalize it. 
 
Reinhart Koselleck  
 
[The ideal solution would be] one that would combine 
practical convenience and reasonable ease and liberality in 
the matter of making unilateral reservations, with adequate 
control, a regard for realities, sound legal doctrine, and 
respect for the rule of law in the international treaty 
relations of States. 
 
Gerald Fitzmaurice  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This article represents the first stage of a larger investigative project. Its principal aim is to 
prepare the ground for a systematic legal-historical examination of a particular international legal 
document. The document in question is General Comment No. 24 (52),
1
 a non-binding 
commentary dealing with the subject of multilateral treaty reservations,
2
 issued on 2 November 
1994 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, a treaty-monitoring body established 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3
 The immediate goal behind the 
exercise is to develop a critically-inflected reading of this document by conceptualising it, firstly, 
as an international legal event, that is to say, as an act of an essentially legal-historical – as 
opposed to ‘simply’ legal – significance; and, secondly, as a formal representation of a 
historically symptomatic development in the structure of the contemporary international legal 
consciousness.  
Two central assumptions inform the logic of the present inquiry. The first concerns the 
question of the historical relevance of General Comment No. 24. Put briefly, what I am going to 
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propose in these pages is that the publication of this document not only established an extremely 
important precedent in the development of a certain, very specific mode of international legal 
governance but also marked one of the most significant turning points in the evolutionary 
trajectory of the contemporary international legal system. A close, analytically rigorous 
examination of the principal formative factors that influenced the effectuation of this turning 
point, follows the argument accordingly, should enable us to obtain a better sense of the essential 
legal-historical implications of the various epochal transformations that took place in the 
architecture of the international legal order during this period and thus work out a potentially 
more insightful understanding of its basic structural limits.  
The second assumption concerns what one might call the question of international legal 
historiography. In a nutshell, my main methodological premise in these pages derives from the 
standard positivist thesis that Law, like every other form of social life, should be essentially 
considered as a fundamentally self-contained aspect of social reality. Applied to the present 
context, the most immediate implication of this hypothesis, as I see it, has to be that the 
‘movement’ of legal history (if one can use that phrase) should be regarded, in principle, as a 
process that is entirely immanent in itself. That is to say, the principal epistemological 
presumption implied by the positivist theoretical outlook must be that, firstly, the course of legal 
history unfolds quite independently from that of ‘economic relations’, ‘culture’, and ‘political 
struggles’; and, secondly, even though it might be over-determined in some exceptional 
circumstances by the impact of various external forces, the course of legal history is always 
inscribed wholly within its own, field-specific, distinctly legal-historical ‘medium’. Inasmuch as 
one accepts the general logic of this conclusion, it follows at this point essentially that the two 
main theoretical questions which must inevitably be confronted by every legal-historical inquiry 
are: (i) what exactly do legal-historical events consist in as a matter of practical realisation, i.e. 
what is that specific ‘material’ from which legal history is ‘comprised’?; and (ii) how exactly can 
the course of legal-historical development be objectively established, i.e. how does one measure 
‘movement’ in the field of legal history?  
Needless to say, no single answer to these questions would be able to satisfy every legal 
historian. Nor, in all fairness, would it make any sense to expect otherwise. In the house of legal 
history, there exist many mansions. There seems to be no reason why all of us should have to 
stay in the same quarters.  
Still, every method, in the end, lives and dies by its capacity for generalisation and 
formalization. What is the essential formula according to which the concept of international legal 
historiography has been constructed in these pages? For the purposes of an introductory 
synopsis, the following five points can be said to provide the answer: 
(1) Epistemology is not ontology. It remains a common truism that in most contemporary 
contexts the word ‘history’ is typically used to describe at one and the same time two 
entirely different concepts. The first of these concepts has as its primary purported 
referent the idea of a certain objectively expressed movement-of-things-through-time; 
the second, the enterprise of recording and measuring the course of this movement as 
a matter of more or less conscious discursive representation. The distinction between 
the two concepts, being essentially a product of a particular cultural sensibility, 
appears in some elementary sense to be fundamentally random. For the purposes of 
the present inquiry, however, it also seems extremely fortunate inasmuch as its basic 
semantic implication helps quite effectively to foreground the central theoretical 
insight of ontological realism, viz.: the world as we know it exists more or less 
independently of our representations of it; this does not mean, however, that we 
should therefore necessarily be able to tell how the world ‘really is’ or where exactly 
in it we ‘belong’, even if we may feel fairly certain about how it ‘is not’ and what we 
aren’t.4 
(a) To distinguish between the two different meanings of ‘history’, the first of 
them (movement through time) will be henceforth described in these pages as 
‘history’ with the small ‘h’; the second (representation), accordingly, as 
‘History’ with the capital ‘H’. 
(2) Directionality: the process of international legal history is irreversible and non-
teleological. The course of legal history has no preordained sense of direction and no 
inherent tendency towards any form of ‘progressive development’ (the ‘history has no 
script’ thesis). It is not circular, loopified, or sequentially patterned (‘history is not a 
process of eternal return’ thesis); nor does it repeat itself in any meaningful sense, 
especially not in the first-as-a-tragedy-then-as-a-farce mode.
5
 Most importantly, no 
amount of ‘constructive interpretation’ should be ever allowed to obscure our 
awareness of that basic incontrovertible truth that as an entirely objective process 
history always moves from an earlier stage to a later stage which grows out of it, but 
at the same time remains entirely distinct from it, and thus ad infinitum (the ‘history is 
an aspect of objective reality, not a product of History’ thesis). 
(3) Cognisability: the process of international legal history can only be accessed at an 
abstract level. In the most obvious sense, this statement means that the objective 
reality of international legal history cannot be studied in the context of whatever 
interactive relations may occur between physical human individuals but only in the 
context involving a certain, very particular class of abstract ‘collective’ entities. In the 
more technical sense, it means that even though like all other kinds of history the 
history of international law is ultimately rooted in ‘natural time’, its ontology is not, 
as a matter of fact, identical with it – that is to say, its objective procession as an 
ontologically independent fact cannot be immediately read in the flow of any natural 
(physical, chemical, biological, etc.) process. Rather, like every other comparable 
historical process, it can only be intellectually recovered at a certain level of 
analytical abstraction (see point 4 below).  
Put differently, the course of international legal history is not directly detectible 
in any ‘visible’ aspect of the immediate lived experience, even if it can, at times, 
leave directly observable imprints within it (e.g. by sanctioning the outbreak of 
military action). Just like the experience of an international legal event can only be 
had within the phenomenological plane of international law (but not within the plane 
of physical, chemical, biological, etc. processes), the experience of international legal 
history can only be had as a function of entering the plane of international legal 
events.  
(a) How one recognises an international legal event is ultimately a function of 
how one defines ‘international law’. The concept of international law that is 
assumed in these pages derives from the classical positivist tradition as 
articulated, for example, in the works of (among others) Ian Brownlie,
6
 Bruno 
Simma,
7
 or the later Hans Kelsen.
8
 It is not, admittedly, the only conception 
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that could be adopted in the present context, but it is one that appears to be 
the most rewarding to work with.  
(4) Continuity: the process of international legal history unfolds in a staggered, non-
linear fashion. If the ontology of international legal time differs from that of ‘natural 
time’, the same it follows should also hold true for the internal rhythm and structure 
of international legal history. What this is supposed to mean for the purposes of a 
legal-historical inquiry can be gleaned from the following argument developed by the 
French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (writing in this context about the ‘rules’ 
of economic-historical investigation):  
 
To go even further, I should say that we cannot restrict ourselves to reflecting 
the existence of visible and measurable times …; we must, of absolute necessity, 
pose the question of the mode of existence of invisible times, of the invisible 
rhythms and punctuations concealed beneath the surface of each visible time. 
Merely reading Capital shows that Marx was highly sensitive to this 
requirement. It shows, for example, that the time of economic production … is a 
complex and non-linear time – a time of times, a complex time that cannot be 
read in the continuity of the time of life or clocks, but has to be constructed out 
of the peculiar structures of production. The time of the capitalist economic 
production that Marx analysed must be constructed in its concept. The concept 
of this time must be constructed out of the reality of the different rhythms which 
punctuate the different operations of production, circulation and distribution: out 
of the concepts of these different operations.
9
 
 
The key to developing a theoretically defensible model of international legal History, 
it is proposed, lies in completing the exact same analytical task as outlined in the 
excerpted passage. To be sure, one would have to replace first the concepts of 
‘production’, ‘circulation’, and ‘distribution’ with similarly positioned legal-
theoretical concepts, but the rest of the exercise will then follow the same general 
logic: the first and the most indispensable theoretical step will be to discard the 
assumption that international legal history must necessarily unfold at the same speed 
or according to the same internal rhythm as ‘natural time’; once this theoretical 
adjustment is made, the next step will be to develop the concept of a multi-layered 
historical space and, as its logical derivation, the idea of a distinctly international 
legal time. Following that, it will be then only a matter of straight logical deduction to 
develop the argument that just as ‘history as a whole’ tends to unfold at different 
speeds in its different ‘sectors’, so too in all probability should international legal 
history. There exists, in other words, no convincing reason to believe that the 
evolution of, for instance, jus ad bellum or the law of international legal sources 
ought to proceed at the same speed or according to the same internal rhythm as that of 
international trade law or the international law of minority rights. Indeed, given the 
relative independence of all these legal regimes from one another, it would seem, in 
fact, a lot more reasonable to conclude, as a matter of general presumption, that they 
must typically follow entirely different historical-developmental trajectories defined 
by entirely different internal rhythmic structures.  
(5) Vertical heterogeneity: the process of international legal history unfolds at several 
different levels, each of which follows its own tempo. From the idea of a multi-
rhythmic structure of international legal history in which the separation of the 
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rhythmic lines is determined by the external differentiation between the respective 
legal regimes, the most obvious next step theoretically will be to develop the concept 
of a multi-rhythmic structure in which the taxonomy of the field’s mutually 
autonomous elements (differently accelerating sub-fields) is presumed to follow not 
so much from the internal patterning of the law’s purported objects of regulation 
(horizontal fragmentation of the international legal regime) but from the experiential 
differentiation in the transformative processes permeating the international legal 
system as a whole (vertical fragmentation). The principal point of reference here, in 
methodological terms, could be found in the standard historiographic distinction 
between the idea of history as the immediately recognisable process of transition 
from one discernible chronological event to another and the idea of history as a field 
of temporal structures reflecting ‘contexts of activity reaching over several human 
generations’,10 that is to say, ‘those temporal aspects of [human] relations [which are] 
not covered by the strict sequence of experienced events’ and ‘which do not 
[therefore] change from one day to the next’ the way chronological events do, but 
which instead represent those very conditions which ontologically make these events 
possible in the first place.
11
  
(a) In the field of what one may call self-consciously historiographic scholarship 
about international law, one finds today three different models for how such 
long-term temporal structures can be theoretically articulated. The first comes 
from Wilhelm Grewe’s (in)famous attempt to establish the logic of 
international legal history as one determined by a quasi-Hegelian pattern of 
linear succession between different ‘national ages’ (international legal history 
as a progression through phases of imperial geopolitics).
12
 The second comes 
from Martti Koskenniemi’s still on-going attempt to re-describe the course of 
international law’s historical development as a succession of ‘intellectual 
sensibilities’ (international legal history as a movement through Foucauldian-
style epistemes).
13
 The third comes from Antony Anghie’s field-redefining 
account of the mutually constitutive relationship between international law and 
the (neo)colonial political project (international legal history as a movement 
through various modes of hegemonic dominance).
14
 While one can argue about 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, none of 
them seems sufficiently suitable for the purposes of the present investigative 
task. Hence the present excursus. 
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SECTION 1. GENERAL COMMENT NO. 24 IN ITS IMMEDIATE CONTEXT 
 
 
a. The Riddle of General Comment No. 24  
 
That General Comment No. 24 was going to ‘make history’ was pretty much obvious right from 
the outset. What was not so obvious was why exactly it ended up happening in the first place. 
For, indeed, however one looks at it, as an act of international legal practice, it seems safe to say, 
it has turned out to be a complete and utter failure. Its essential argument seems to have found no 
support among the member states; the force of the doctrinal opinion for the most part has turned 
entirely against it; and, having been cited approvingly only once in the nearly two decades that 
have passed since its adoption (and even that in a case decided by the Committee itself),
15
 it 
seems rather obvious now that no part of its substantive vision has (yet) found its way into 
international custom.
16
  
What is more, it seems, any international lawyer worth their professional salt should have 
been able to foresee all this right from the very beginning. One would not need to know much 
about the law of treaty reservations to be able to figure out just how much of a backlash a legal 
reform initiative proposed by a treaty-monitoring body that seeks to remove all powers of 
appraisal and validation from the member states of that treaty regime in favour of the treaty-
monitoring body itself was likely going to provoke. Nor would one need to have a particularly 
extensive grounding in the comparative constitutional law tradition to be able to notice that the 
essential operative logic of such an initiative seems suspiciously close to that of judicial self-
aggrandizement. Even the briefest acquaintance with the basic argument formula deployed in 
Marbury v. Madison would be enough to confirm this conclusion.
17
 Considering the undeniable 
quality of the legal talent on the bench, it seems highly unlikely that none of the members of the 
Committee involved in the drafting process behind General Comment No. 24 would have been 
able to spot this. And yet still they went ahead and after all that time that they had to deliberate 
over it decided nonetheless to press on with this initiative and formulate it in that particular 
language that they did. Why?  
 
b. Anxieties of a Latent Discourse: What the Structure of the Received Wisdom Reveals 
 
Much has been written on the question of treaty reservations over the last two decades. Scholars 
from many different traditions and backgrounds have tried to tackle the subject in one way or 
another. Some have approached it from the perspective of the traditional doctrine of sources.
18
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Others addressed it under the more theoretically adventurous rubric of ‘international legal 
constitutionalism’.19 Still others restricted themselves to simply restating whatever black-letter 
rules they could be vouched for, without going into any bigger questions of political or legal 
theory.
20
 Each group clearly believed theirs was the most valuable contribution. And yet not a 
single page in all of this output addressed the basic legal-historical riddle behind General 
Comment No. 24: why did this document come to be the way that it turned out? 
Or at least that is the initial impression one would typically get from surveying the state 
of the discourse at its surface. For, indeed, beneath every pattern of silence, there always lies the 
possibility of a hidden systematicity: the absence of an open discussion, as Michel Foucault has 
so brilliantly demonstrated on so many different occasions, as often as not can signify the 
establishment of an area of tact and discretion, and neither tact nor discretion, of course, are the 
enemies of discursive transmission.
21
 
Behind every regime of apparent ignorance as often as not a careful investigation will 
discover the presence of a fully functional discursive formation, latent and anonymous in its 
existence, but not for all that any less effective or ambitious. To be sure, this ‘law’, to the extent 
to which one can call it that, at best is only a projection of a tendency. There exists, in other 
words, no logical guarantee that behind every instance of discursive omission one will always 
find a ‘hidden’ conversation. But in the present case, for good or ill, this tendency certainly 
seems to hold true.  
Beneath all the apparent silences and elisions, behind all the random asides and 
fragmentary comments, one can still make out the contours of a common, fairly well-established 
narrative about General Comment No. 24. Stripped of all its rhetorical complications, taken in its 
most typical configuration, what this narrative ultimately seeks to propose is that the essential 
legal-historical meaning of General Comment No. 24 taken as an international legal event was 
that it was either the product of a monumental failure of judgement or an outcome of a 
fundamentally corrupted process of decision-making. Either, in other words, it must have been 
the case that the members of the Committee had somehow failed to anticipate how negatively the 
member states were going to react to any perceived loss of power, including that allegedly 
inflicted in the name of furthering the cause of the international human rights protection, or, 
better still, the only reason why they ended up going on the kind of wild Marburyesque 
adventure that they did was that they completely lost sight of their professional mandate.  
In the first case, the general argument typically tends to proceed along the following 
lines: of course, it is certainly true that in some ideal sense ‘bodies such as the Human Rights 
Committee are the best guardians of the treaties whose implementation they supervise’, but the 
world of international law is the world of realpolitik, not ideal situations, and in this world 
‘States [will always] resist the seepage of power away from States parties and towards such 
bodies’.22 The fact that the members of the Committee seem to have forgotten about this obvious 
fact is deeply puzzling – one would not usually expect such kind of lapses from such an 
esteemed group of experts – but what happened to their reform initiative as a result of that was, 
of course, completely unsurprising. States did what states always do. Ruthless struggle for power 
is the iron law of international politics.  
In the second case, the standard argument pattern tends to be a little more complex. What 
pushed the Committee over the edge in this interpretation of events would not be usually 
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attributable to the influence of any one single cause but rather the combination of a whole set of 
fundamentally quite distinct factors: typically, a certain kind of ideological co-optation dynamics 
(by human rights extremists), an unhealthy dose of personal hubris (on the part of the individual 
members of the Committee), and the onset of an essentially unforeseeable turn of world-historic 
events (the end of the Cold War). The following passage from D. W. Grieg provides a highly 
illustrative example of this kind of argument:  
 
It would appear that [in declaring the vision that it did in General Comment No. 24] 
the Committee relied primarily on [its mandate under] Article 40(4) of the 
Covenant. [But] the scope of Article 40(4) is relatively narrow and certainly does 
not appear to bestow powers on the ‘jurisdictional plane’ [which the Committee 
appears to assert]. Nevertheless, despite a lack of any firm basis in this provision, a 
number of members of the Committee have regarded that body as having a quasi-
judicial nature based upon its status as guardian of the Covenant. Although there 
were also members who represented the alternative, narrower view of the 
Committee’s role and functions, this became an increasingly minority attitude. With 
the changes in Eastern Europe diminishing the political significance of the latter, 
the Committee has been able to assert an essentially pro-human rights ideology less 
hampered by the demands of supporters of State sovereignty. It is this shift which 
prompted the Committee to tackle reservations, clearly a manifestation of that 
sovereignty, in the way that it did in General Comment No. 24(52).
23
 
 
For, indeed, it was only after 
 
April 1992 [that the Committee] adopted the [practice] of issuing ‘comments’ on 
every State report it has considered. This is also symptomatic of the move towards a 
more judgmental role for the Committee. A similar development appears to be 
taking place with regard to the system of ‘general comments’ provided for in Article 
40(4). In the past they have been notable for their generality [but now that has come 
to pass].
24
 
 
Looking from this angle, the conclusion seems rather impossible to avoid:  
 
[it was the p]olitical changes which have produced changes in personnel and 
attitudes within the Committee [that] were undoubtedly responsible for the totally 
different tone of, and approach adopted in, General Comment No. 24(52).
25
 
 
Notice two interesting points about the two argument patterns. Firstly, what appears to start out 
as a decidedly descriptive historical explanation in both cases quickly turns into a thinly veiled 
attack on the Committee members’ basic sense of professionalism. In the first case, the 
supporting evidence is found in the alleged failure to take cognizance of the essential logic of 
realpolitik; in the second case, in the perceived inability to resist the temptations of hegemonic 
adventurism and activist ideologies. The clearly detectable consequence in both contexts is that 
the resulting narrative pattern automatically slips into what after Martti Koskenniemi one would 
call a fundamentally apologist mode of reasoning.
26
  
Secondly, rather characteristically, both strands of the narrative also seem to place a 
rather strongly pronounced emphasis on the idea that the key to the whole episode in legal-
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historical terms has to be sought exclusively in the world of politics and never in law. Recall 
again Grieg’s language: it was ‘undoubtedly’ an accumulation of ‘political changes’ that was 
‘responsible’ for the adoption of a ‘totally different’ ‘tone and approach’ by the Committee. The 
actual legal mandate on which the Committee ‘appeared’ to rely did not support its argument; 
the ‘changes in Eastern Europe’, however, allowed it to relax its standards of reasoning, which is 
why the advocates of ‘human rights ideology’ had the upper hand over the ‘supporters of State 
sovereignty’. Notice how consistently the implied causational picture behind each argument 
tends to stress what in the vocabulary of classical liberal theory would be called the pole of 
‘power and glory’, i.e. the logic of subjective desire, impulse, and passion.27 Notice also how 
glaringly absent in both cases is made the possibility that, who knows, perhaps, what may have 
motivated the drafters of the Comment was not only their ideology or personal politics (or for 
that matter their mastery of the art of realpolitik) but also the objective dynamics of the 
immediate legal regime they were working with or the impersonal pressures of syllogistic logic.  
Notice, finally, also how strange this interpretation suddenly starts to look when one 
considers all these points. Surely, whatever may have been going through the heads of the 
Committee’s members when they set out to draft the text of the Comment, one of the first things 
that one would tend to notice about this document as a legal historian would be that, not being an 
act of international lawmaking, it was first and foremost meant to be received as an artefact of 
deductive legal reasoning, that is to say, a product of labour created by a group of people who 
work primarily in the medium of logical argument and whose sole justification for commanding 
any degree of attention (and thus of having any measure of political agency) derives entirely 
from their capacity to sustain a sense of professional identity that is specifically rooted in the 
idea of legal interpretation. Surely, if one sought to find out what could and must have happened 
to and among such people – people who live and work ‘in’ and ‘with’ law and logic – it would 
not be at all incongruous to presume that a large part of what may have driven their actions had 
something to do with the way the specific legal problem and the specific legal materials on 
which they worked lent themselves to objective logical resolution. And yet, the apparent 
disciplinary consensus quite clearly tends to assume otherwise. What sort of reasoning, 
inevitably arises the question, could prompt such a peculiar interpretative turn?  
The answer, I think, should not be too difficult to guess. Consider once more the most 
obvious implications of identifying ‘ideology’, ‘personnel changes’, and ‘geopolitical 
contingencies’ as the main culprits behind an apparent failure of a legal reform initiative. The 
essential role of the ideology trope in the present context has almost certainly been to evoke a 
certain sense of bias and partisanship; that of the personnel changes trope, to hint at the 
possibility of corruption and the abuse of process; that of geopolitical contingency, to bring to 
mind the idea of a force majeure. The more one thinks about what sort of rhetorical projects 
would normally be best served by such an arrangement of topoi – the more attentively, in other 
words, one examines the symptomatic implications of what other topoi could have been as easily 
introduced in the present context but for some reason were not – the more obvious it seems to 
become that in the logic of the common disciplinary narrative the greatest sin committed by the 
drafters of General Comment No. 24 was not that they managed somehow to overlook the power 
of realpolitik or that they disrespected the principle of state sovereignty or gave in too eagerly to 
the cause of human rights activism. It was rather that by failing to achieve what they set out to 
achieve in that document they somehow jeopardised in the eyes of the disciplinary orthodoxy the 
very project of modern international law itself.
28
 For, indeed, unless one were actually convinced 
that the fallout from this whole episode ultimately threatened to damage the prospects of the 
international rule of law itself, why would one ever feel such an intense need to insinuate that 
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whatever it was that might have come into play behind General Comment No. 24, it quite 
certainly was completely extraneous to anything that had anything to do with law or legal 
reasoning? Why make such a concerted effort to persuade one’s readers that it was not ‘just’ a 
case of unconvincing interpretation, but a full-scale abuse of the process?   
To attack one’s colleagues in such openly aggressive terms, to present the fruits of their 
labour as either the product of some kind of professional incompetence or the outcome of a 
fundamental lack of objectivity – this is not just your everyday clash between the progressive 
and the conservative wings of the international law profession. What we are witnessing here, 
rather, seems to be much more like an intra-disciplinary equivalent of what in the broader social 
context would be called the politics of constitutive expulsion,
29
 that is to say, a politics whose 
animating dynamics is informed by a logic essentially indistinguishable from that whereby in a 
quasi-Schmittian move the aggressing party reserves for itself the universalising label of 
‘humanity’ so as to be able to relegate its adversary all the more effectively to the position of the 
universal outcast.
30
 
There was something unsettling about the speed with which this sort of attacks began to 
break out in the scholarly discourse: Grieg’s piece came out the next year after the Comment’s 
publication, a lighting-speed reaction in the world of academic publishing. But the scholars who 
unleashed their criticism in the pages of the learned publications were certainly not alone in 
expressing their acute disapproval of the Committee’s initiative. Less than a year after the 
Comment’s release, in an entirely unprecedented step in the history of the Covenant regime a 
group of three states parties to the Covenant proceeded also to issue a series of official national 
responses to the Comment.
31
 The overarching message in each case was as blunt as it was 
unambiguous: taken on its merits, the position advocated by the Committee was essentially 
untenable and indefensible. To adopt it as a matter of law would lead to a complete disregard of 
the established principles of the modern law of reservations as codified in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
32
 What is more, in advancing that sort of initiative in that 
sort of format, the Committee had also flagrantly violated the limits of its institutional mandate. 
If only because of this, its argument had to be considered void and deserved to be rejected.  
The second claim, admittedly, seemed a lot less strained than the first: however one 
looked at it, it did seem broadly true that the Committee effectively sought to short-circuit the 
standard treaty amendment procedure in a context where no part of its established mandate could 
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be plausibly interpreted in such a way as to support this prerogative. And yet, curiously enough, 
in each of the three state responses it was primarily the first claim that seemed to carry the 
greater emphasis. Even more interestingly, the general logic of the argument in each case also 
seemed to follow the exact same basic formula:  
(1) When the Committee declared that the traditional approach to the law of reservations 
established under the Vienna Convention had proved itself to be fundamentally inadequate in the 
case of multilateral human rights treaties, it completely misinterpreted the whole situation. Its 
reasoning proceeded from the assumption that while the Vienna regime was essentially designed 
to apply only in the framework of horizontal synallagmatic inter-statal relations, the Covenant, 
being a human rights treaty, did not ultimately operate according to the synallagmatic logic. The 
silent explosion of dubious reservations which had begun in recent years and which in the 
Committee’s opinion threatened to undermine the Covenant’s substantive integrity was meant to 
be the strongest indication of this disjunction. Lest the Covenant were allowed to collapse under 
the weight of these illegitimate reservations, it followed, an entirely new regime of rules had to 
be created, and no international body would be better placed to address this task than the 
Committee itself.  
(2) Unfortunately for the Committee, both its initial assessment of the situation and its 
resulting prescription were entirely off the mark. In the first place, the Vienna regime was, in 
fact, perfectly well ‘suited to the requirements of all treaties, of whatever object or nature’. The 
regulatory dynamic it created, thus, remained adequate to ensure that ‘a satisfactory balance 
[would be preserved] between the objectives of preservation of the integrity of the text of the 
treaty and universality of participation in the treaty’ in all cases, and this ‘appl[ied] equally in the 
case of reservations to ... treaties in the area of human rights’.33 No new, Covenant-specific 
regime, in other words, was required either as a matter of legal fact or as a matter of policy, and 
the fact that the Committee had concluded otherwise could only be interpreted as an indication of 
how seriously out of touch with the international legal reality it had become. 
(3) Not surprisingly, given the essential fallacy of its starting assumptions, its final 
conclusion with regard to how this new regime would have to be organised in practice, while 
interesting in principle, turned out to be equally as incorrect in its legal reasoning as it was in its 
underlying policy vision.
34
 
 
c. General Comment No. 24 and the Vienna Regime: a Rejection or a Continuation of the 
Tradition?  
   
To what extent were these criticisms valid? Looking at the actual text of General Comment No. 
24, it seems difficult not to notice that whatever objections the Committee may have had against 
the Vienna regime, its disapproval of the latter was exclusively focused on its institutional and 
procedural dimensions and not at all on its substantive component. In fact, if anything, on the 
latter front, the Committee, as even the briefest glance at the text of the Comment will 
demonstrate, has actually remained as perfectly orthodox and steadfast in its commitment to the 
Vienna approach as it gets.  
 
i. The Committee’s argument 
 
‘The absence of a prohibition on reservations’, begins its argument at the start of §6, ‘does not 
mean that any reservation is permitted’:  
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The matter of reservations under the Covenant and the first Optional Protocol is 
governed by international law. Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties provides relevant guidance. It stipulates that where a reservation is not 
prohibited by the treaty or falls within the specified permitted categories, a State 
may make a reservation provided it is not incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the treaty. Even though, unlike some other human rights treaties, the Covenant 
does not incorporate a specific reference to the object and purpose test, that test 
governs the matter of interpretation and acceptability of reservations.
35
 
 
Put differently, the Committee quite obviously has no intention of challenging the enduring 
relevance of the so-called compatibility test. Moreover, in interpreting it, it also agrees to take its 
cue directly from the Vienna Convention itself, the relevant provision of which reads: ‘A State 
may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a 
reservation unless … the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.’36 
This much established, the Committee then immediately proceeds – just as the logic of 
the Vienna compatibility test would require it to – to investigate the exact content of the 
Covenant’s essential ‘object and purpose’, which it finds to be  
 
to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil and 
political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally 
binding for those States which ratify [the Covenant]; and to provide an efficacious 
supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken
37
 
 
– and to deduce from this what types of reservations to the Covenant would most likely have to 
be considered ipso facto inadmissible:  
- ‘reservations that offend peremptory norms’ (§8);  
- reservations that affect those provisions of the Covenant that ‘represent customary 
international law’ (§8) as well as, to some extent, those provisions that in the Covenant 
itself are designated as non-derogable (§10);  
- reservations that affect rights listed in Articles 1 and 2 of the Covenant (§9); and  
- such reservations as are designed to remove those ‘supportive guarantees’ which ‘provide 
the necessary framework for securing the rights [listed] in the Covenant’, or, in other 
words, reservations that are designed to leave the Covenant rights without the 
corresponding remedial structures (§11-15).  
All throughout, the tone of the discussion leaves no room for any kind of doubt: the Committee’s 
loyalty to the compatibility test theory remains unreserved.  
The language pretty much speaks for itself: ‘applying more generally the object and 
purpose test to the Covenant, the Committee notes that…’(§9); ‘these guarantees … are … 
essential to its object and purpose’(§11); ‘while there is no automatic correlation between 
reservations to non-derogable provisions, and reservations which offend against the object and 
purpose of the Covenant, a State has a heavy onus to justify such a reservation’ (§10). 
 Even when the discussion reaches the point where the Committee starts to voice its 
concerns about the Vienna regime, the terms in which that is done still indicate an unflinching 
commitment to the compatibility test model:  
 
As indicated above, it is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that 
provides the definition of reservations and also the application of the object and 
purpose test in the absence of other specific provisions. But the Committee 
                                                 
35
 General Comment No. 24, supra n.1, §6. 
36
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n.32, Art. 19. 
37
 General Comment No. 24, supra n.1, §7. 
believes that its provisions on the role of State objections in relation to 
reservations are inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human 
rights treaties. Such treaties, and the Covenant specifically, are not a web of inter-
State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of 
individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place, save 
perhaps in the limited context of reservations to declarations on the Committee's 
competence under article 41. And because the operation of the classic rules on 
reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not seen any 
legal interest in or need to object to reservations.
38
  
 
The lack of sufficient response by the appraising States is not, of course, a problem limited only 
to human rights treaties. The proposition that ‘the absence of protest by States cannot imply that 
a reservation is either compatible or incompatible with the [given] object and purpose’39 in this 
regard holds true for all types of multilateral treaties. Note, however, the complication created by 
Article 20(5) of the Vienna Convention: unless the treaty provides otherwise, if a reservation has 
not been challenged for more than twelve months after it had been notified to the given 
contracting party, it will be deemed to have been effectively accepted by that party. In the case of 
those treaties which unlike the Covenant can be reduced to ‘webs of inter-State exchanges of 
mutual obligations’, the risk that this procedural setup creates – viz. that an otherwise 
incompatible reservation might ‘slip through’ and become validated sub silentio – will typically 
be non-existent: if nothing else, the basic dynamics of national self-interest is going to be enough 
to ensure that any attempts by the reserving State to unduly reduce the level of its treaty 
commitments vis-à-vis its treaty partners will be appropriately challenged and extinguished by 
the latter’s timely protests. With human rights treaties, however, the situation appears to be 
completely different. Because of the way in which the legal regimes they create are organized, 
the standard behavioural dynamics engendered under such treaties will not typically produce 
sufficient levels of incentivization for their parties to start challenging one another’s 
reservational actions, regardless of how dubious these latter might otherwise appear. If the 
essential logic of the compatibility test approach is to be preserved for such kind of treaties, it 
follows, consequently, an entirely different institutional-procedural arrangement would have to 
be created compared to what is otherwise provided under the traditional Vienna model.  
It is true, of course, that the Covenant itself has nothing to say about the question of 
reservations, which means according to the standard rules of treaty interpretation that this matter 
therefore has to be settled by default, according to the general logic of the Vienna regime. 
Nevertheless, it seems equally true also that the basic design flaws of this regime identified by 
the Committee have already allowed an alarming number of substantively very questionable 
reservations to slip through the safety net of Article 20(5). Clearly, the more of these reservations 
are allowed to remain in force, the more certainly this will defeat the realization of the 
Covenant’s essential purpose and object, which, as the Committee points out, unquestionably 
includes the creation of a commonly binding system of minimal standards of treatment. Surely, it 
would be entirely preposterous to assume that the drafters of the Covenant, having spent so many 
years working on it, would have intended to allow this sort of scenario to happen. Surely, what 
all of this means in other words, concludes the Committee, is that unless one decides to ignore 
tout court the whole point of the Covenant’s existence, one has to agree that even though on the 
whole the Vienna regime on reservations must be considered by default to constitute an integral 
part of the Covenant’s legal structure, there has to be made a strong presumption against 
imparting into the Covenant’s fabric those parts of the Vienna regime which would make it 
incapable of dealing with the aforementioned problem of questionable reservations.  
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Put differently, unless one is ready to make the assumption that the Covenant was 
essentially designed to fail, one would have to accept as a matter of elementary logic that the 
operative mechanism for the appraisal and validation of Covenant reservations should be 
transferred onto a completely different institutional platform to ensure the formation of a 
decision-making environment that would not depend for its operation on the individual decisions 
of the contracting parties and would not thus be made vulnerable to the shortcomings of Article 
20(5). Given the existing institutional architecture, what better candidate can one find for this job 
than the Committee itself? As the Covenant’s official treaty-monitoring body, it not only has 
both the required kind of expertise and the necessary measure of political impartiality but in the 
performance of its other functions it has already had to engage, as a matter of standard routine, in 
exactly that sort of review and oversight exercises. Why not formalize what already seems to be 
the established practice anyway?
40
   
 
ii. Analysis 
 
Three points spring to attention at this stage. First, whatever one might think of this line of 
reasoning, it is certainly nowhere near as fanciful, outlandish, or lacking in precedent as the 
argument presented by its critics seems to imply. Both the principle of effectiveness argument in 
treaty interpretation
41
 and the implied powers argument in the law of international institutions 
belong among some of the most common tropes in modern international law discourse.  
Second, despite its purported ‘rebellion’ against the Vienna regime the Committee’s 
actions quite clearly seem to have been inspired by its commitment to the compatibilist logic. 
Whatever objections the Committee may have had against the general logic behind the modern 
law of treaties, dissatisfaction with the compatibility test approach was certainly not one of them. 
Moreover, even its Marbury-esque arrogation of powers seems to have been dictated by the need 
to ensure the realisation of the compatibilist reasoning: ‘It necessarily falls to the Committee to 
determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the 
Covenant.’42  
Thirdly, note now also the way in which this last comment combines with the earlier 
noted claim that the absence of protest by the contracting parties does not in itself dispose of the 
issue of reservational compatibility. To suggest that the question of compatibility both can and 
needs to be determined independently of the reactions of the contracting parties according to the 
traditional doctrinal taxonomy adopted in the law of treaties would be typically considered an 
illustration of the so-called permissibility theory of reservations.  
 
d. Permissibility vs. Opposability: the Story of a ‘Doctrinal Quarrel’ 
 
The issue in question, it seems, was first identified in the context of the great jurisprudential 
debates of the mid-1970s, which in the received memory
43
 have come since to be associated 
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primarily with the names of the Cambridge professor Derek Bowett (permissibility school) and 
the Judge of the International Court of Justice Jose Maria Ruda (opposability school).
44
  
As summarized by the International Law Commission, essentially 
 
the adherents of the ‘permissibility’ school consider[ed] that a reservation contrary to 
the object and purpose of the treaty was in itself void, irrespective of the reactions of the 
co-contracting States, while those of the ‘opposability’ school, on the other hand, 
thought that the only test as to the validity of a reservation consisted of the objections of 
the other States.
45
 
 
Thus, from the perspective of the permissibility school, the nullity of a reservation ‘could be 
decided “objectively” and in the abstract’46 – which meant, inter alia, that it could be invoked 
even by that State which ‘had not itself made any objection to it’47 – whereas from the 
perspective of the opposability school, the matter could only be settled by examining the actual 
reactions of the other contracting parties, which meant, by implication, that if a State after the 
passage of a certain period of time had not explicitly objected to the given reservation, it would 
be estopped from presuming its nullity in any subsequent dispute involving itself and the 
reserving State. Over time, the permissibility approach went on to form the implicit basis of the 
official British position on the subject,
48
 as well as coming to be endorsed by many British-based 
international law scholars,
49
 while the opposability approach came to enjoy greater recognition 
among continental international lawyers.
50
 The International Law Commission, in typical 
manner, sought to work out some kind of a middle ground, which in an even more characteristic 
fashion it found no better way of achieving than by declaring, firstly, that the ‘doctrinal quarrel’ 
between the two schools was ‘perhaps insoluble’51 and quite possibly also ‘exaggerated’,52 but 
that, secondly, it could nevertheless be concluded that ‘although the “permissibility” school was 
probably right in theory, the “opposability” school more accurately described the actual practice 
of States.’53  
It is not immediately clear how much weight one should assign to this sort of comments 
or what exactly their legal status might be, but at the level of general logical analysis it should 
not be too difficult to work out the basic theoretical difference between the two approaches.  
1. As a matter of its implicit assumptions about how the legal universe works, the 
permissibility approach appears to be rooted in an essentially pre-modern theoretical 
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sensibility. On the epistemological front, it implies a conception of the legal-
interpretative process of the kind one would normally expect to see in the writings of 
some classical natural law theorist but certainly not in the context of a modern-day 
international legal regime. On the ontological front, rather than recognizing the view 
that in a legal system built on consent every treaty necessarily has to be regarded as a 
‘living document’ whose contents can always be amended by the conduct of its 
parties after its formal conclusion, it opts for the view that every legal regime should 
be effectively treated as an artefact frozen in time. Put the two assumptive patterns 
together and what comes out is essentially a theoretical framework whose operative 
structure appears to be based as much on old-school Aristotelian essentialism as on 
eighteenth-century formalism.
54
  
2. By contrast, the essential logic of the opposability approach at its root seems to imply 
a fundamentally post-modern concept of lawmaking. The argument that a reservation 
that might otherwise be incompatible with the respective treaty’s object and purpose 
should nevertheless be considered legally valid because it has been so accepted 
through the acts of other contracting parties
55
 is a quintessential illustration of the 
proposition that ‘legality is a product of performative practices’56 and that 
‘treatymaking is a language game’.57  
3. There exists no theoretically coherent way of reconciling, on the one hand, the 
essential logic of the permissibility approach and the decentralized institutional 
mechanism established under the Vienna Convention, and, on the other hand, the 
essential logic of the opposability approach and the idea of the compatibility test. If 
one takes seriously the proposition that the validity of a given reservation can be 
established ‘objectively’ in se, there exists no reason to assign the powers of appraisal 
and validation to every other contracting party. Indeed, if anything, both elementary 
policy considerations and the dictates of logic pull in the opposite direction: 
objectivism and cacophony never go well together.  
On the other hand, if one chooses to believe that the validity of a given 
reservation should be considered a function of how the other contracting parties have 
responded to it, then, all things considered, from the point of view of regime-
construction dynamics it would have been a lot more sensible to dispense with the 
substantive requirement of compatibility altogether. Rather than introducing 
something as complicated as the compatibility assessment requirement, the test at the 
heart of Article 19 could have been framed in such a way as to necessitate the 
conclusion that a proposed reservation would be considered valid if it has not been 
challenged by, say, more than one-half of the other contracting parties.
58
 Such an 
approach, while problematic from the point of view of sovereignty theory, would 
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have had the undoubted virtue of being extremely easy to implement, since it would 
have given rise to none of those interpretational difficulties typically associated with 
trying to establish the exact meaning of a document co-written by a whole crowd of 
authors commonly instructed to keep the terms of any deal they sign up to as general 
and vague as possible. What is more, it would have also made a lot more sense in 
terms of its institutional element: decentralisation, like all forms of democracy, 
always militates in favour of some form of majority vote and thus demands a full 
acceptance of the principle of subjectivism in decision-making. The proposition that a 
reservation should be appraised in terms of its inherent compatibility with the object 
and purpose of a given treaty goes against this principle.  
Indeed, one might even say that it is not until the discussion switches back into 
the permissibility theory mode that the concept of measuring a treaty’s object and 
purpose starts to make any sense. And yet, given the decentralised structure of the 
Vienna procedure, how can the basic assumption of the permissibility approach be 
maintained? The idea of objectivism inevitably requires the achievement of some 
kind of decisional closure. In the absence of an authoritative means of determining 
whether the given reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the 
respective treaty, the right to make that determination, under the logic of Article 20, 
falls to every contracting State. But if each State is free to make its own determination 
‘and there is no agreed means of compulsory judicial settlement or collective decision 
procedure, does not the test of impermissibility lose its practical significance?’59 
The answer to that, as every proponent of the opposability school would insist, 
has to be a resounding yes. But then what does one do about the fact that the 
compatibility test has been given such a pride of place within the overall structure of 
the Vienna regime? The logic of the opposability approach presumes an unqualified 
endorsement of the subjective reactions of other contracting parties; the inherent setup 
of the compatibility test presupposes some sort of objective appraisal. If the 
subjective decision is both sufficient and necessary, why would the drafters of the 
Vienna convention bother including in it any objective benchmarks? Judge Ruda’s 
oft-repeated remark that Article 19(c) was only intended as a source of ‘guidance to 
States regarding acceptance of reservations, but no more than that,’60 might make 
some sense logically, but it does not look very convincing given the Convention’s 
actual normative structure and its drafting record, nor indeed the fact that the 
introduction of the compatibility test into international law long predates the adoption 
of the Vienna Convention.  
A contradiction? Certainly. But how should one go about resolving it?  
Consider how this challenge must have looked from the Committee’s point of 
view: on the one side, it was confronted with a need to give force to an explicitly 
applicable substantive legal standard that was firmly rooted in doctrine, treaty law, 
and State practice; on the other side, it was faced with an implicitly created regulatory 
predisposition arising out of an essentially arbitrary set of historically accumulated 
conditions that as far their legal status was concerned had never been endorsed as part 
of lex lata and indeed seemed to have nothing better going for them than that ‘things 
have always been this way’. Which of the two considerations should be given 
normative precedence? Considering the unquestionable centrality of the compatibility 
test to the Vienna regime, it would be utterly unthinkable to reduce it simply to the 
rank of a discretionary guideline. Considering the historically demonstrated 
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malleability of the institutional structure of the international arena, it would seem to 
be equally unthinkable to give what in effect is a completely contingent constellation 
of non-juridical events the status of a self-justifying legal principle.  
To be sure, the choice which the Committee made in the end could not be shown 
to have had the full approval of the Vienna Convention’s signatories. But it certainly 
seemed to be far more consistent with the overall logic of the regime they had created 
than its alternative. By proposing to discard the decentralized appraisal mechanism in 
favour of a centralised procedures of quasi-judicial review, the Committee not only 
did not go against the foundational principles of the Vienna system; it set out an 
initiative that, if realised in practice, would have led to results that would be far less 
disruptive of the Vienna regime’s basic design than the alternative its critics seemed 
content to promote. 
 
 
e. Doctrinal Genealogy 
 
 
Two basic conclusions seem to suggest themselves at this point:  
 
(i) Whatever may have been the full historical meaning of General Comment No. 24, it 
certainly did not mark an attempt to break away from the Vienna tradition. Far from 
being a paradigm-disruptive endeavour, it should be thus regarded rather as a direct 
logical continuation of a pre-existing regulatory dynamics. 
 
(ii) Given that the Vienna tradition itself was the product of a rather protracted history of 
lawmaking efforts, to grasp the fundamental significance of General Comment No. 24 as 
a legal-historical event it appears to be necessary to determine not only what set of 
specific differences separates its essential substantive vision from that of the traditional 
Vienna regime, but also what basic position it occupies in the context of the broader 
legal-theoretical landscape of ideas that has developed in the course of the historical 
evolution of the modern law of treaty reservations as a whole. Put differently, any 
reasonably precise characterization of the fundamental legal-historical meaning of 
General Comment No. 24 must begin with what in the structuralist-semiotic tradition 
would be typically called an intertextualist reconstruction
61– or, to use the term in a 
decidedly non-Foucauldian sense, an attempt to trace out its basic doctrinal genealogy.
62
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SECTION 2. THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN LAW OF RESERVATIONS: 
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 
 
Few questions in modern international law seem to be considered as well settled as that of the 
general trajectory of the contemporary law of reservations. The standard account replicated from 
one leading source to another invariably rehearses the same basic formula: an unmistakably 
linear timeline consisting of three relatively clearly delimited stages each of which gave rise to 
its own distinct philosophy and a corresponding set of preferred doctrinal solutions.
63
  
The first stage, as commonly envisaged, is understood to have started at some point 
around the turn of the 20
th
 century. Its main doctrinal legacy was the so-called ‘unanimity 
theory’, or, as it also came to be known in some parts of the literature, the ‘traditional rule’ or the 
‘classical view’.64 Endorsed formally by the League of Nations in 1927, the unanimity theory 
approach, as the name suggests, advocated the view that any reservation previously unagreed 
with one’s treaty partners required their full unanimous consent in order to become valid. Even a 
single objection would be sufficient to nullify the proposed modification of terms and block the 
reserving State’s accession attempt.65 As commonly assumed by the subsequent generations of 
scholars, the rise of the unanimity approach marked the ideological zenith of the so-called 
contractualist theory of treaty-making. Whether or not that is indeed so, the unanimity rule quite 
certainly continued to remain the central point of reference in every academic discussion of the 
law of reservations long after it began to fall out of favour in the world of state practice. 
The second stage in the history of the modern law of reservations began at the height of 
the interwar period. The new philosophy that came to exemplify it went on to be known simply 
as the ‘Pan-American approach’, on account of being championed at first only by the members 
of the then Pan-American Union (now the Organization of American States).
66
 Compared to the 
unanimity theory, the Pan-American approach advocated a much more liberal stance with regard 
to the question of when and how the reserving State could submit a previously unagreed 
reservation. The essential presumption according to this view of things was that those contracting 
parties that were not content to accept the proposed reservation could simply refuse to consider 
the reserving State a co-party for the purposes of their bilateral relations inter se, without thereby 
preventing it from becoming a party to that treaty tout court. As the conventional wisdom has it, 
though at first it remained somewhat unpopular, as time went on the greater practical flexibility 
offered by the Pan-American approach increasingly came to be recognised even outside the 
American region, as the needs of the international political intercourse made recourse to open 
multilateral treaties ever more common.  
Following the end of World War II, however, there soon arose an ever more liberal 
vision. Like the Pan-American approach, it, too, did not receive any special designation in the 
scholarly literature. Some authors proposed to call it the ‘sovereignty theory’ because it 
effectively argued that the use of reservations could not be legitimately restricted in any way 
because doing so would violate the inherent prerogatives of sovereign statehood.
67
 Most 
commentators, however, simply described as the Soviet approach.
68
 As it was mainly 
championed by the Soviet Union, the sovereignty theory approach did not find any ideological 
support in the West. Given furthermore that its essential premise was also seen to contradict the 
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then dominant conception of treaty relations – stripped to its basics the Soviet view effectively 
implied that once a reserving State submitted its reservation a legally binding duty of 
(re)negotiation was immediately created on all other contracting parties – it never came to be 
taken seriously in the academic domain either.
69
 Nevertheless, given the obvious power of the 
political momentum behind it and the easily recognisable continuity between its general logic 
and that of the Pan-American approach, the sovereignty theory approach did play an important 
historical role in shaping the evolutionary trajectory of the modern law of reservations, by 
helping finally bring an end to the doctrinal hegemony of the unanimity theory in academic 
discourse. 
By the late 1940s, as every vestige of the unanimist consensus dissipated, the implosion 
of the old academic certainties quickly registered in the world of state practice. Confusion set in 
across every applicable doctrinal debate, ‘widely divergent views’ began to be expressed in 
every suitable judicial and political forum,
70
 until finally in November 1950 the matters came to 
a head with the decision of the UN General Assembly to mobilize the newly created UN 
advisory machinery to help resolve the impending crisis. In response to the recent controversy 
triggered by the attempt by a number of Eastern bloc States to submit a series of reservations to 
the 1948 Genocide Convention
71
 considered unacceptable by the rest of the convention’s parties, 
the Assembly decided firstly to request a direct advisory opinion on the matter from the 
International Court of Justice, while at the same time also instructing the newly established 
International Law Commission to produce a more general report on the same subject. The 
implicit assumption behind this dual-track approach seemed to be that the Court, being a judicial 
institution, would most probably end up delivering its answer de lege lata, whereas the 
Commission, being an institution explicitly charged with the task of helping to develop 
international law rather than simply restating it, was going to formulate its views de lege 
ferenda.
72
 Ironically enough, in the end everything seemed to turn out in the exact opposite way. 
The Commission decided to throw its weight behind the old unanimist approach,
73
 while the 
Court went on to articulate what to all intents and purposes proved to be a completely new way 
of thinking about the subject of treaty reservations that had no immediately traceable basis either 
in the previous doctrinal debates or in the contemporary State practice.
74
 For good or ill, 
however, as much as the Court’s critics went on to pour vitriol on its apparent abandonment of 
its duty, over the next decade and a half the new vision it formulated in the Reservations case
75
 
evolved into the centrepiece of the new doctrinal consensus. At the conceptual core of this new 
consensus lay the radically unprecedented assumption: the question of whether or not a proposed 
reservation was legitimate could be resolved far more effectively by simply analysing the 
objective structure of the respective treaty itself rather than by reference to the subjective rights 
and privileges of the contracting parties.  
Even though at first nobody seemed to find the logic behind the new theory particularly 
convincing, over time even its initial critics gradually came to accept it as the ‘least 
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objectionable’ solution compared to its alternatives.76 For the States of the Eastern bloc, it was 
most probably their lack of sufficient political capital that would have been required to secure a 
greater advancement for the sovereignty theory that ultimately sealed the deal. For the supporters 
of the unanimity theory, by contrast, it was almost certainly the fact that the new approach 
advocated a considerably less permissive attitude towards the practice of reservations than either 
the sovereignty theory or the Pan-American approach that made it seem as the most attractive 
practical compromise. For the supporters of the latter, on the other hand, the new approach 
seemed to be so close in its spirit to their own basic model that whatever minor differences 
existed between them could be easily overlooked.
77
 Obviously, the basic notion behind the 
compatibility test theory around which the Court articulated its new conceptual framework had 
no direct parallel in the Pan-American tradition. But, surely, the addition of one new normative 
element was more than a reasonable price to pay when a regional practice turned into the 
prototype of the new global consensus. Even the International Law Commission, although it had 
at first vigorously opposed the Court’s new vision, with the appointment of Humphrey Waldock 
as the new rapporteur on the law of treaties in the early 1960s swiftly reversed its stand on the 
matter.
78
 By the time the 1969 Vienna conference opened no participating State expressed any 
support for the unanimity theory.
79
 The ‘classical view’ no longer met the needs of the time. The 
page had finally turned. The age of the compatibility test entered its zenith.  
 
**** 
 
One should not, of course, ask too much of any received wisdom. But the quasi-Hegelian sense 
of teleology which animates this particular narrative – note the implicit pattern of dialectical 
progression behind the suggested sequence: from the ‘thesis’ of the unanimity theory to the 
‘antithesis’ of the Pan-American model and the sovereignty theory and thence to the ‘synthesis’ 
of the compatibility test approach – certainly seems worthy of critical attention. As do too the 
obvious quasi-Darwinian overtones behind the implicit projection of a close functional fit 
between each theoretical model and the respective ‘historical stage’ in the evolution of 
international relations. But let us not jump too far ahead of a story whose logic has not yet 
reached the point of its explicit self-recognition.  
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SECTION 3: THE CLASSICAL AGE: 
FROM THE WILL THEORY TO MODERNISM 
 
 
a. The Unanimity Theory vs. the Pan-American Approach: First Impressions 
 
 
What was the legal-historical meaning of the unanimity theory and the Pan-American approach? 
At first glance, the only difference between the two models seems to stem from their ‘territorial’ 
scopes: the Pan-American approach was commonly understood to be nothing more than a 
regional custom, while the unanimity theory was typically presented as having a (nearly) 
universal application,
80
 even if in reality it was only a ‘European view’.81 Beyond this obvious 
point, however, everything about the two models seemed to be essentially the same. 
Functionally, both the one and the other were obviously designed to operate as untailored default 
rules. In structural terms, both were also designed on the explicit assumption that they would be 
applied in the context of a systematically decentralized legal order. The institutional conditions 
of operability projected behind both regimes, thus, seemed virtually identical, as did also the 
resulting operative potential: both the unanimity theory and the Pan-American approach lent 
themselves equally effectively to practical application in the case of open as well as closed 
multilateral treaties.  
Naturally, the immediate contents of the proposed regimes appeared to be quite different: 
the unanimity theory favoured a highly restrictive use of reservations, whereas the Pan-American 
approach advocated the opposite. But from the legal-analytical point of view such kind of 
substantive differences do not actually carry that much significance. What matters far more, 
instead, are the structural design of the proposed regimes and their broader systemic potentials, 
and on both of those counts the two models seemed like peas in a pod.  
Or, at least, so it would appear at first glance.  
 
 
b. Default Rules 
 
 
A default rule is essentially a set of standard assumptions which a third-party adjudicator in a 
contractual dispute would be expected to resort to, as a matter of law, in order to ‘fill in the 
blanks’ in an incompletely specified contract when the resolution of the particular dispute come 
to turn on the meaning of the respective ‘blanks’.  
A different way of putting this would be that a default rule is basically a presumptive 
contractual provision which the contracting parties can always contract around by simply 
including the respective set of clauses in the text of their contract; if they do not do this, the 
provision will apply as though it had been included into that contract ‘by default’. Hence the 
name. One can think of this mechanism as contract law’s variation on the idea of the normative 
safety net. One can also think of it, from a slightly different angle, as a special case of opt-out 
clauses. Unlike a standard opt-out clause, a default rule is incorporated into the fabric of the 
respective contractual relationship as the result of a public legal order dynamics. Neither the 
parties, nor the adjudicator, in other words, have the choice not to apply the default rule when the 
respective circumstances arise. Nevertheless, if the contracting parties adopt a different legal 
regime ex ante, the default rule will have no place in their contractual relationship.  
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The fact that the contracting parties can thus escape the reach of the default rule suggests 
that, in principle, such rules could be described as the ‘soft’ type of public law obligations. Their 
application is made systemically compulsory, but the dynamics of compulsion is flexible and 
leaves quite a bit of room for manoeuvre. Seen from this angle, a typical example of a ‘hard’ 
public law obligation, by comparison, would be the prohibition of murder under criminal law or 
the general obligation to pay taxes. What makes default rules different from both of these types 
of obligations is that the latter in theory are designed to be non-negotiable and immutable in their 
operation.
82
 Or at least that is how they are usually conceived.
83
  
Given that the ground norm in the modern law of treaties is supposed to be the principle 
of consent, one will not, as a general matter, encounter that many ‘immutable rules’ in this area 
of international law. The vast majority of all substantive rules in the law of treaties are, thus, 
structured in the shape of default rules. A classic example can be seen in the case of the principle 
of pacta tertiis: although the general rule holds that a treaty concluded between two States will 
not create legal rights for a third State, if the parties to the treaty so decide, they are free to 
change this arrangement, so long as they expressly confirm their intentions to that end.
84
  
 
 
c. The Peculiar Case of Tailored Defaults: A Concept as a Chimera 
 
 
According to the received wisdom, there exist two main types of default rules: tailored and 
untailored defaults. The tailored default approach, as the name suggests, requires the adjudicator 
to ‘tailor’ his choice of the legal regime to the particular facts of the case, or, in other words, to 
fill the gaps in each given contract in such a way as would most accurately reflect what the 
contracting parties themselves would have bargained for in the first place. By contrast, the 
untailored default approach requires the adjudicator to impose the same standard solution in all 
situations, regardless of how the individual parties in question may have been inclined originally 
to structure their deal.
85
 At first glance, between the two, the former would seem to be a lot more 
attractive. Its attitude towards the parties’ position in the dispute seems a lot more liberal and 
progressive. It recognises the need for every contractual situation to be treated on its merits. Its 
starting premise enables the adjudicator to recognise every nuance which modern business life 
will present him with and accommodate it accordingly. Its ideological underpinnings fit much 
more readily with the idea of contract as a mechanism for private ordering and the notion of the 
freedom of contract.  
But one only needs to look at it a little more closely to see that in reality all of this is just 
an illusion. In reality, the concept of a tailored default is a completely false concept – not in the 
plain everyday sense that it ‘lies’ about something, but in the more abstract analytical sense that 
it embodies what could be called a juristic chimera: ‘something hoped for but illusory or 
impossible to achieve’.86   
Consider the basic theory behind the idea of tailored defaults.  
The vast majority of scholars who have supported the use of tailored defaults in the last 
thirty years have come from the background of classical (Coasean) law-and-economics. For 
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them, the proposition that the default rule should always be ‘tailored’ flows directly from the 
foundational assumptions of the Coasean concept of transaction costs. From the perspective of 
the Coasean theory, a contract will only ever be left uncompleted when the costs of explicitly 
addressing all the various contingencies that may arise in the course of its practical lifetime 
outweigh the benefits its parties will draw from negotiating the relevant clauses. Ideally, this 
state of affairs should only happen when the probability of these contingencies ever materialising 
will not be deemed to be that great or when the magnitude of whatever damage would be brought 
on in the case they do materialise will not be considered sufficiently high.
87
 In practice, however, 
many contracts tend to go uncompleted even where it would be objectively for the best if the 
relevant clauses were fully specified in advance. The reason this happens, goes the argument, is 
because of the transaction costs.  
Note the emphasis on the word ‘Coasean’ in the previous paragraph. Not every strand of 
modern law-and-economics lends the same degree of intellectual respectability to the idea of 
tailored defaults. What sets the Coasean strand apart from, say, institutional law-and-economics 
is its rather peculiar combination of epistemological and ontological assumptions about the 
nature of contractual negotiations. The root of all these assumptions, of course, lies in the famous 
‘Coase theorem’.88 As with every other grand argument, there exist many possible formulations 
of the Coase theorem. The one that speaks most directly to the present discussion is this: where 
the level of transaction costs rises above zero, the legal rule which most effectively minimizes 
the impact of these transaction costs will lead necessarily to the achievement of the most efficient 
allocation of the respective set of resources.
89
 The language may seem a little opaque, but in the 
Coasean law-and-economics tradition the notion of ‘efficient allocation’ operates, in effect, as 
the byword for the ‘most optimal state of affairs’. Translated into the normal language, thus, the 
basic meaning of the Coase theorem is that the more effectively the given legal regime helps to 
neutralise the impact of transaction costs in the given case, the easier it will become for the 
respective set of private parties in the course of their interactions with one another to achieve the 
most optimal state of affairs conceivably.  
Now, the key to understanding why the concept of tailored defaults is essentially a false 
concept lies precisely in the logic by which this last conclusion is generated.  
Look closely: when the effect of the transaction costs is brought down to zero, under the 
Coasean assumptions it will be expected that the interacting parties will choose freely to 
negotiate with one another until such point where the party that is most interested in the 
acquisition of the particular resource will acquire/retain it in the exact required measure. Once 
that point is reached the most efficient allocation of the respective set of resources will be 
achieved and so will therefore the most optimal state of affairs. So far, so good, but note now the 
reason why the contracting parties are expected to act in this particular way. Under the Coasean 
assumptions, a typical legal subject is presumed to be simultaneously perfectly rational in the 
course of his decision-making as well as fully informed about the ‘real worth’ of all contested 
resources and other parties’ valuations of it. Furthermore, he is also assumed to be inherently 
peaceful, risk-neutral, and fundamentally uninterested in resorting to any form of strategic 
behaviour (lies, threats, etc.). Put differently, the parties are expected to negotiate with one 
another until the point where the party that is most interested in the acquisition of the particular 
resource will acquire/retain it in the exact required measure because these parties are assumed to 
be perfectly mathematical in all aspects of their decision-making as well as perfectly assured that 
everyone else’s decision-making is perfectly mathematical too.   
If the argument starts to seem a little circular by this stage, that is because it actually is. 
What the Coasean formula states, in effect, is that the perfect equilibrium will be achieved when 
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everyone involved is presumed to want to act in the only way in which the perfect equilibrium 
would be achievable and when there are going to be no interfering factors that would frustrate 
their intentions. When the proof is always-already made part of the starting assumptions, one can 
be pretty much guaranteed one will not fail to arrive at it.  
Now, as a general matter, the proposition that a typical contracting agent will possess all 
these remarkable qualities which the Coasean formula so curiously seems to take for granted will 
probably strike an outside observer as a little odd. But that is not where the rub of the matter lies. 
Note again that the two principal preconditions at the heart of the Coase theorem are ‘transaction 
costs’ and ‘free negotiations’. In the more traditional usage, the former idea essentially translates 
as ‘whatever prevents the agreement from being achieved’ and the latter as ‘protecting the 
exercise of the freedom of contract’. Apply these translations to the earlier formulation, and what 
eventually comes out is the conclusion that whenever in any given contractual setting the level of 
the associated transaction costs begins to rise above zero, the achievement of the most efficient 
allocation of resources will be impaired precisely to the extent to which these transaction costs 
will frustrate the realization of the contracting parties’ freedom of contract in such a way as to 
prevent them from concluding the respective agreement. Put more straightforwardly, if you have 
high transaction costs but you still want to achieve ‘the most optimal state of affairs’, do 
everything you can to protect the freedom of contract and the rest will automatically follow.  
It should be clear by now where this argument is going. One only needs to add this last 
‘discovery’ into the context of the general theory of default rules to see how the concept of 
tailored defaults inexorably starts to take shape. The more profoundly one internalizes the 
Coasean assumptions, the more evident it becomes that whenever the adjudicator in a contractual 
dispute confronts an incompletely specified contract, he should strive to fill every gap in that 
contract in such a way as to give force to whatever he thinks the contracting parties in question 
would have bargained for (for, indeed, that would be the only way to restore the magic 
perfection-creating dynamics of free negotiations upset by the prohibitively high transaction 
costs).  
Now, one could make, of course, any number of observations about this line of 
reasoning.
90
 But only two seem to be immediately relevant.  
First, there clearly exists a direct and very strong logical link between showing preference 
for advocating tailor defaults, holding completely unrealistic assumptions about the general 
psychological, intellectual, etc. qualities of a typical contracting agent, and believing in the thesis 
that protecting the freedom of contract will necessarily lead to the achievement of the most 
optimal state of affairs.  
Second, the expectations raised of the aforementioned third-party adjudicator under the 
tailored default approach are at the very least completely indefensible. In the practical reality of 
contractual relations, even the immediate participants of the original negotiating process 
themselves will not, as a general matter, ever be able to reconstruct a reliable sense of ‘what they 
would have bargained for’. One can list any number of reasons for why this would be the case, 
but the following seven should suffice: (i) people usually tend to forget things in an oddly self-
serving way; (ii) contrary to the Coasean formula, people are never fully informed about each 
other’s intentions; (iii) there is such a thing as the ‘endowment effect’;91 (iv) ‘[many] people are 
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idiots’;92 (v) there is such a thing as ‘false consciousness’;93 (vi) there is such a thing as ‘strategic 
dishonesty’; (vii) when one deals with an unspecified contract, it follows by definition that the 
contracting parties did not actually negotiate anything for the given contingency, so whatever 
they may say now about how they would have settled this question is really just a series of 
unverifiable speculations.  
Even if we overlook all the other arguments, this last point seems quite incontrovertible. 
Once we accept it, however, there only remains a very small step to the inevitable conclusion 
that every ‘reconstruction’ is really just an indirect form of ‘imposition’, that is to say, even the 
most conscientious attempt at working out a tailored default in the end always collapses into 
some form of untailored default. Naturally, one may still consider it a good idea to retain the 
concept of tailored defaults as a convenient legal fiction – if only in order to give the judges a 
general sense of ethical duty towards the contracting parties – but from the analytical point of 
view it represents a complete impossibility. All default rules are untailored. The only question is: 
untailored to what degree?  
 
 
d. Penalty Defaults 
 
 
A particular subclass of untailored defaults deserves special mention at this point: the so-called 
‘penalty default rules’.  These are those rules which on the one hand serve the same general 
function of filling-in-the-blanks in incomplete contracts but on the other hand also seem to be 
aimed to discourage the contracting parties from actually relying on them. The basic idea behind 
a penalty default, in other words, is ‘to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they 
would prefer.’94  
A good example of a penalty default rule in contemporary international law is the so-
called Most-Favoured Nation clause in Article I of the GATT. According to this rule if a WTO 
member State decides to award preferential treatment to any product originating in or destined 
for any other State, whether or not the latter itself should be a member of the WTO, is required 
immediately and unconditionally to extend the same preferential treatment to all like products 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other WTO members.
95
 The penalty element 
here consists in the fact that if the WTO member in question goes to the trouble of concluding a 
separate customs union or a regional free trade area with the privileged State and the overall 
level of duties established as a result of this union does not exceed the ‘general incidence’ of 
such duties prior to the union’s formation, under Article XXIV the requirement to extend the 
same favours to everyone else would not have applied.
96
 Put differently, the implicit message 
behind the GATT MFN clause is that if the member State wants its trade relations to continue to 
be governed by Article I, it is more than welcome to do so, but it would be considerably better 
off if it contracted out of it under Article XXIV.
97
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Typically, penalty defaults are introduced in two different categories of cases: (i) those 
where in the opinion of the lawmaker it would seem to be more appropriate to compel one of the 
parties to invest in negotiating a certain set of terms ex ante rather than leaving the matter to be 
resolved ex post through the respective dispute settlement procedure; and (ii) those where in the 
opinion of the lawmaker, if the penalty default had not been adopted, the ‘penalised’ party would 
have obtained an undesirable measure of strategic advantage over other parties thanks to some 
form of fundamental informational asymmetries, i.e. would effectively engage in an undesirable 
form of rent-seeking behaviour.
98
 In the former case, the general rationale for the use of the 
penalty default would be that this will lower the costs of ex post dispute resolution or even 
prevent the need for it altogether. In the latter case, the rationale would be that the use of the 
penalty default will redress the informational asymmetry among the involved parties by 
compelling the more informed party to disclose the strategically useful information it has to the 
less informed parties through announcing how/that it would like to contract around the given 
default rule.  
As with all other regulatory instruments, penalty defaults are certainly not a perfect 
instrument. One side’s penalty can easily become the other side’s ‘windfall’. Thus, an excessive 
use of penalty defaults may create its own set of rent-seeking incentives and lead to an 
undesirable degree of opportunism.
99
 Put differently, there is no magic answer to the question of 
whether or not the lawmaker should use a penalty default in any particular scenario, since the 
real dilemma is never whether or not there should be any rent-seeking/opportunism as such, but 
rather which particular kind of rent-seeking/opportunism should be tolerated and which should 
be penalised.  
And that is precisely the point where the inherent structural differences between the 
unanimity theory and the Pan-American approach finally begin to reveal themselves. 
 
 
e. The Unanimity Theory: A General Characterisation 
 
 
The basic proposition at the heart of the unanimity theory states that if the multilateral treaty in 
question itself does not specify otherwise, ‘a party to [that treaty] is only entitled to make such 
reservations as the other parties are content that it should make.’100  
Viewed from this angle, reservations would 
 
only [be] permissible if the convention itself provided for them, or if the drafting 
conference had discussed and agreed to them. Subsequent reservations could be 
proposed unilaterally, ... but to be admissible they must be generally assented to, either 
expressly or sub silentio. If objected to by any [party] entitled to object, the reservation 
must be withdrawn, or the reserving [party] could not be regarded as a party to the 
Convention.
101
 
 
What was the essential rationale for the unanimity theory? Looking at the related scholarly 
discussions, it seems that the typical argument in favour of this approach would usually consist 
of the following four claims: 
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(i) unanimity theory protects the integrity of the treaty commitment by increasing the 
likelihood that every contracting party will be bound by the same set of obligations 
and thus limits the scope for regime fragmentation;  
(ii) if each State were allowed at its discretion to cherry-pick those elements of a 
multilateral convention which it liked and exclude all the rest, the other signatories 
would not be getting ‘what they bargained for’ and so the essential balance behind 
the agreement would be ‘impaired and even destroyed’;102  
(iii) by limiting the use of reservations, the unanimity model prevents the proliferation of 
‘false agreements’: ‘where nobody is prepared to make concessions, it is idle to talk 
of agreement. It is not the least of the disadvantages of reservations that they serve to 
hide this unfortunate fact’;103  
(iv) in cases where the treaty’s entry into force is predicated on the achievement of a 
determinate number of ratifications, any other solution would lead to a much greater 
degree of uncertainty as to the treaty’s status and timeline.  
 
The fourth claim is the least persuasive of all: if the contracting parties should indeed care about 
this kind of scenario, it would be far more reasonable for them simply to specify what type of 
ratifications will count under which circumstances and to give the treaty’s depositary the 
requisite instructions than to introduce what in effect amounts to a blanket prohibition on the use 
of reservations as a matter of customary international law. Seen against the background of the 
other three claims, the fourth claim, furthermore, appears to be the last one to have been added to 
the common repertoire, considering that the only circumstances under which it would make any 
sense to try to articulate this argument would be when the substantive benefits of the unanimity 
theory required defending against the challenge coming from a more reservations-permissive 
model, which, of course, did not happen until after the Pan-American approach started gaining 
support. Last but not least, insofar as it appears also to be a bit more of a contextual speculation 
about the comparative advantages of the unanimity model than a ‘standalone’ statement detailing 
its inherent virtues, it could also be argued that the fourth claim should generally be discounted 
for the purposes of any attempt to explain the ‘original theory’ behind the unanimity approach.  
The other three claims, however, suggest an entirely different story. First, despite the 
initial appearances, what we are looking at here is not, in truth, a combination of three separate 
claims but rather three different versions of one and the same claim. Note the repeated references 
to the notions of ‘bargain’, ‘true agreement’, and ‘the integrity of the agreement’. What each of 
these tropes signals is the presence of the same two fundamental premises that underpin each of 
the three arguments: (i) the ‘truth’ of the treaty regime lies in the actual bargain achieved 
between its parties which this treaty formally expresses in the material form; (ii) the local ground 
norm in the law of reservations is to preserve ‘what the parties had bargained for’.  
Neither idea at first sight will seem immediately noteworthy – nor should it, really, if one 
considers it only from the point of view the general tradition of the law of treaties scholarship. 
However, if one adopts a slightly broader analytical perspective, a close examination of the 
underlying structure of legal-theoretic assumptions will begin to reveal a number of rather 
interesting features. The most obvious among them, as any attentive student of legal history will 
immediately recognise, should be the fact that in terms of its operative reasoning protocol this 
pattern of argument appears to reproduce the exact same analytical formula which in the broader 
legal-historical context has been commonly associated with the so-called ‘will theory’ approach 
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to the law of contractual transactions, that is to say, a way of thinking and talking about the law 
of contracts that had been typically characteristic of the 19
th
 century Classical Legal Thought.
104
  
Briefly, the main assumption at the heart of the will theory approach was that ‘the law of 
contract [existed to] protect the wills of the contracting parties’.105 To use the classic formula, to 
a 19
th
-century lawyer a contract was essentially the meeting of its parties’ minds and the basic 
guiding principle of the law of contract was the idea of the sanctity of the freedom of contract. 
So long as each contracting party entered the given contractual engagement freely and their wills 
could thus be said to converge into a single psychological whole, the legal system had to respect 
their decision: whatever bargain the parties might have thus achieved between them, with the 
exception of those few cases where this would jeopardise the peace of the realm or threaten the 
ordre public, deserved the unqualified protection of the law. The concept of the ‘meeting of the 
minds’, on this view of things, became both the ultimate raison d’être and the main limiting 
principle of the law of contract: the law of contract existed in order to help enforce private 
agreements between parties, but such agreements deserved to be enforced only inasmuch as they 
represented the free communion of their parties’ rightfully expressed wills; when push came to 
shove, thus, the first thing every legal decision-maker would be expected to do was determine 
what exactly the parties in question had willed to happen between themselves before proceeding 
thence to deduce the most ‘freedom-compatible’ resolution. Put differently, without the freedom 
of contract, there was no point in ‘having’ a law of contract, or – which is essentially the same 
thing – without linking enforcement to the wills of the parties, no part of the system had any 
legitimacy.  
The parallels between the theoretical logic informing the will theory approach and the 
implicit assumptional matrix underlying the unanimity model should become rather obvious at 
this point – except, of course, that, the operative mechanics of the will theory approach presumes 
that the law of contract can only ever use perfectly tailored default rules, since anything else 
would be effectively tantamount to disregarding the contracting parties’ ‘meeting of the minds’. 
The unanimity model, on the other hand, quite evidently, advocates the use of an untailored 
default solution. How can one explain this paradox?  
 
 
f. The Rise and Fall of the Will Theory of Contract  
 
  
As commonly presented in modern legal historiography, the will theory of contract first took off 
at some point in the earlier half of the nineteenth-century, went through a period of seemingly 
unstoppable expansion in the mid to late 1800s, endured a quarter century or so of acute 
ideological crisis around the turn of the century, and then finally fell from grace sometime after 
the end of World War I.
106
 From the point of view of the general character of the transformations 
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which took place in its operative premises over this time, one can distinguish, broadly speaking, 
three principal stages in its evolution: subjectivism, objectivism, and modernism.  
Subjectivism. In its earliest stage, the will theory approach, one might say, was practised 
in its most immediately recognisable form. Every contract was conceived, literally, as the 
material manifestation of its parties’ underlying communion of the wills.107 A legally binding 
contractual obligation, it was thus understood, could only be created where there had been 
established a full ‘convergence of individual desires’,108 which meant, in effect, that for any 
private agreement to become legally enforceable in practice it had to be first conclusively proven 
as a question of fact that the wills of its parties had previously converged into a single 
psychological entity called the ‘meeting of the minds’. In the absence of such a proof, any 
attempt at enforcement would have to be considered fundamentally illegitimate and 
inappropriate.  
A classic example traditionally cited in the literature to illustrate the subjectivist approach 
is the English case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus.
109
 The defendant agreed to buy from the plaintiff a 
consignment of cotton to be shipped from Bombay to Liverpool on a merchant ship named 
Peerless. As it later turned out, there had been, in fact, two different ships called Peerless which 
sailed from Bombay to Liverpool that year. One sailed in October, the other in December. The 
plaintiff apparently had it in mind that the consignment would be sent by the latter, while the 
defendant believed that it would be sent by the former. When the shipment arrived, the defendant 
refused to pay, citing the absence of a valid legally enforceable contract between itself and the 
plaintiff. The court, having examined the facts of the case, upheld the defendant’s argument on 
the ground that there had been no actual ‘consensus ad idem’, which meant that the minds of the 
parties could not have possibly met, and so no legally binding contract could exist between them.  
As outlandish as this reasoning might seem to the modern eye, in the mid-1800s it 
appears to have been perfectly common: and not just in England or the Anglo-Saxon world more 
generally, but also in continental Europe. (Indeed, as various contract law historians have pointed 
out, most of the leading ideologues of the subjectivist theory were French and German jurists, 
especially those of them working in the Historical School tradition.)
110
  
Objectivism. The subjectivist stage did not last very long. Already by the last quarter of 
the 19
th
 century the general conception of the nature of contracts – how they came into being, 
and under what conditions they deserved to be enforced – underwent a radical change. Partly 
under the influence of what the critics of this innovation later saw as a ‘misapplication of the 
principle of estoppel’,111 partly as a reaction against the notion that to think of minds ‘meeting’ 
one another was ultimately in truth a rather silly idea,
112
 but mainly, it seems, due to the rapid 
spread of the solidarist philosophy among the juristic intelligentsia in continental Europe,
113
 the 
practice of contract-making in the Western legal tradition increasingly came to be understood 
                                                 
107
 ATIYAH, supra n.106, 407. 
108
 Horwitz, supra n.106, 923. 
109
 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).  
110
 See Roscoe Pound, The Role of Will in Law, 68 Harv L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1954); Cohen, supra n.106, 575; and 
ATIYAH, supra n.106, 407 (all explicitly identifying Savigny as the key figure in this regard). See also, more 
generally, Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 Suffolk L. Rev. 631, 
638-9 (2003). 
111
 KENNEDY, supra n.104, 212 (quoting Clark Whittier). 
112
 For a typical (if also rather polite) expression of this sentiment, see Cohen, supra n.102, 575: ‘The metaphysical 
difficulties of this view have often been pointed out. Minds or wills are not in themselves existing things that we can 
look at and recognize. We are restricted in our earthly experience to the observation of the changes or actions of 
more or less animated bodies in time and space; and disembodied minds or wills are beyond the scope and reach of 
earthly law.’ For a somewhat more forceful version of the same argument, see, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental 
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Col. L. Rev. 809 (1935). 
113
 The connecting figure in this regard was the French private law theorist Rene Démogue. For background, see 
Kennedy, supra n.105, 109-13, 115-9, esp. n.75 on 117.  
less and less in terms of the subjectivist concepts of ‘wills’ and ‘minds’ and increasingly in terms 
of the sociologically established objective patterns of ‘what people normally do when they do 
contracts’.114  
To be sure, the old language of ‘wills’, ‘intentions’, and ‘meetings of the minds’ to a 
large extent still remained in use, but the analytical emphasis now consistently shifted from 
proving the ‘internal facts’ about the parties’ intentions to establishing the presence of a 
legislatively defined list of what were taken to be the standard outwardly observable signs of 
‘what people normally do’. As a transitional measure, the first step in the development of the 
doctrine was that the presence of these external signs established a rebuttable presumption that 
the internal meeting of the minds indeed took place. Very soon, however, even this fiction was 
discarded. The concept of intent was reduced to the observance of a certain ‘verbal formula’115 
and the workings of the will were reconceptualised as a simple behavioural act.
116
  
Starting from around 1900, the general sense that one had to keep at least some place for 
the thesis of the communion of the wills quickly began to dissipate. In the earlier stages of the 
objectivist period, the standard argument would still presume that the move from the subjectivist 
to the objectivist theory of contract was necessitated because, as Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously proposed, in practice ‘the law [should] take[] no account of the infinite varieties of 
temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so 
different in different men’ because ‘the standards of the law are [meant to be] standards of 
general application’. Given this fact, continued the logic, it followed inevitably that the question 
of legal enforcement had to be resolved solely in terms of those ‘external phenomena, manifest 
acts and omissions’ which the enforcing organ could verify with any degree of certainty, since 
not only was it entirely appropriate that the law should remain ‘wholly indifferent to the internal 
phenomena of conscience’, but it was also exceedingly obvious that, wherever required, one 
could always substitute the latter with the aforementioned external acts, on the presumption that 
when it came to deciding which of these acts precisely should be equated with which specific 
‘phenomena of conscience’ the law would only have to consider ‘what would be blameworthy in 
the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence’, never really bothering about 
the particular individual in question.
117
  
By the time the next generation of scholars took the centre-stage, the argument sequence 
became much more telegraphic. ‘A contract’, declared Judge Learned Hand in 1911, ‘has, 
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract 
is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.’118 Note the assured terseness of 
Hand’s formulation and the absence of any perceived need to justify the switch from the 
subjectivist to the objectivist approaches. ‘Parties’, wrote Arthur Corbin six years later, ‘are 
[only] bound by the reasonable meaning of what they said and not by what they thought.’ ‘The 
operative act creating an obligation is the expression of intention and not the thought process.’119 
Note how much further the analytical shift goes in Corbin’s restatement of the objectivist 
principle: where Hand’s formulation still seeks to address the point that the ‘external acts’ are the 
juridical stand-in for the ‘individual intent of the parties’ because of the force of ordinary 
practice, Corbin’s definition is already free of any attempt to rationalise the substitution of the 
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one for the other. It is the reasonable meaning of what the parties said that creates a contract, 
nothing less, nothing more.  
Fast forward another two years, and Samuel Williston’s articulation coms out even more 
forcefully: ‘At the present time courts of law ... have expressly or by implication asserted that the 
words and acts of the parties are themselves the basis of contractual liability, and not merely 
evidence of a mental attitude required by the law.’120 From being ostensibly ‘only’ a more 
appropriate probative factor, Holmes’s ‘external phenomena’ and ‘manifest acts’ turn now into 
the only legally valid basis for recognising the existence of a contract.  
Modernism. The third stage began as the direct continuation of the same pattern. Where 
the main defining feature of the objectivist mindset was to show no concern for the ‘internal 
phenomena of conscience’, the main defining trait of the modernist paradigm was to extend also 
the same attitude to those ‘external words and acts’ on which the objectivist scholars pinned their 
theories. The central focus of the inquiry, on this view of things, no longer lay with any form of 
empirical factual investigation. For the modernist mind, the answer to the question of legal 
enforceability rather began directly at the point of consulting the applicable legal materials.  
Any social transaction, however informal or incomplete, it was understood now, could 
qualify as a contract so long as the specific set of legislatively determined conditions was 
verified to have taken place. Sometimes the conditions in question would be defined in a very 
specific manner; at other times, however, it would be enough that they could be simply 
‘reasonably implied’. All that mattered, in the end, was just how much formality the law required 
to demonstrate in each given case. If the law allowed a private transaction to be enforced as a 
contract even where the ‘external words and acts’ that would typically be expected of a ‘man of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence’ were never performed or initiated, then so be it.121 For the 
modernist mind, a contract was a contract because and whenever the law said so. 
Naturally, some notion of consensuality was still included in the supporting doctrinal 
architecture. But the implicit conception of what consensuality meant at this stage was now no 
longer modelled on the kind of state-of-the-art, bespoke instruments drafted  between the two 
traders in Raffles v. Wichelhaus. The principal point of reference from this time on was rather 
found more in the standard-form everyday transactions ‘created by such acts as boarding a bus, 
or ordering a meal in a restaurant’.122 Doubtless, even with respect to this type of deformalized 
standard-form operations it still remained true that the parties’ intentions had to play some kind 
of a role:  
 
Companies do not run buses by accident, and passengers do not board buses in their 
sleep. But it [did] not follow [from that] that the classical model of contract which [saw] 
such relationships as involving ‘mutual promises’ [still had] any real validity to it. It is 
true that the bus company and the passenger have rights and liabilities which arise out of 
their relationship, and it is also true that in the great majority of cases, both parties have 
some notion, however hazy it may be on one side, of what those rights and duties are. 
But even then it does not follow that it is their consent, their joint act of will, which 
creates the rights and duties. It is surely more realistic to recognize that it is their actions 
which create the relationship, and the law which creates the rights and liabilities as a 
                                                 
120
 Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 Ill. L. R. 85, 87 (1919-20). 
121
 See as a typical illustration Joel Levin and Banks McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice 
in Voluntary Obligations, 29 McGill L. J. 24, 27 (1983): ‘What is important … is the element of obligation. 
Obligation is not meant to be a substitute for promise, nor do we wish to convey the impression that contracts are 
made by individuals who intentionally obligate themselves so as to be put under contractual duties. [O]ne need not 
make express promises, believe, or even realize that contractual duties have arisen. … The subjective state of mind 
of an obligor who fails to understand the consequences of his act is irrelevant. Our definition [of contract] supposes 
[merely] that one engages voluntarily in an act that objectively imposes an obligation.’ 
122
 ATIYAH, supra n.106, 734. 
result of those actions. The ‘implied promises’ are often largely fictitious, and it would 
not matter a whit if they were proved to be non-existent.
123
  
 
And thus the circle closed. In less than one century, the objectivist revolution, having started as 
nothing more than a well-intentioned attempt to upgrade the slightly more dubious elements of 
the will theory approach, inevitably led to its full and comprehensive demise. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it seems obvious that this sort of result was only to be expected. As soon as the first 
generation of objectivist scholars put forth the suggestion that it was the ‘external acts’ and not 
the ‘internal phenomena of conscience’ that created a contract in the eyes of the law, the turn to 
modernism became only a matter of time. For indeed, if it was really true that a contract did not 
ultimately express the wills of its parties, then whenever the law did enforce any given 
instrument this would have to be so not because the legal system cared about protecting the 
integrity of the parties’ bargain, but because of some other, completely independent 
considerations. What sort of considerations? The answer to this question can already be found in 
Corbin:  
 
it is said sometimes that the law will create that relation which the parties would have 
intended had they foreseen. [Be that as it may.] The fact is, however, that the 
[enforcement] decision will [always] depend upon the notions of the court as to policy, 
welfare, justice, right and wrong, such notions often being inarticulate and subconscious 
[but not for all that any less important].
124
  
 
As soon as the matter was formulated in such terms, the question inevitably came to the surface: 
if the decision to enforce was effectively only a question of public policy, why not just state this 
fact ‘in the open’? Put differently, if it was true that whatever it was that the law of contracts 
upheld was not in actual fact supposed to be a reflection of what the contracting parties had 
originally had in their minds, why bother at all with all this ‘meeting of the minds’ talk? What 
difference would it make if one simply discarded all these buzzwords outright? The answer, as it 
quickly turned out, was: a very significant one. The moment the meeting-of-the-minds doctrine 
began to be removed from the operative conceptual apparatus of contract law the rest of this 
framework inexorably began to fall apart as well.   
If the law of contract was not, in fact, derived from the idea of protecting the wills of the 
parties, how could one justify retaining all those rules, doctrines, and principles which were 
developed over the years on the explicit assumption that it was? What could be the reason, for 
instance, for retaining the traditional doctrine of privity or the doctrine of duress in those exact 
configurations into which they historically evolved? By what logic could one justify preserving 
those particular rules on unconscionable contracts and contracts of adhesion that had developed 
by the mid-1920s?  
Once the genie of doubt left the bottle, there was no stopping. Given the centrality of the 
will theory paradigm to Classical Legal Thought, it was only a question of time before the 
challenge originally developed in the field of contract law began to spread to every other area of 
the legal system. Why does the law refuse to enforce collective bargaining agreements against 
non-consenting union members? Why should there be liability only when there is fault? Why 
should the law take for granted the landowners’ freedom to do whatever they want on their 
property regardless of any social consequences of their acts?
125
 All these long-standing rules and 
presumptions flowed in one way or another from the deductive ‘interpretation’ of what the 
French jurist Rene Démogue called the principle of the autonomy of the will (‘autonomie de la 
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volonté’),126 a proto-theoretical concept which in the context of the law of delict, for instance, 
took the form of the doctrine of fault-based liability, in the law of property the doctrine of 
animus occupandi,
127
 and in the law of contract the doctrine of the meeting of the minds. Once 
the contract lawyers declared their branch of autonomie de la volonté both practically and 
theoretically bankrupt, the rest of the edifice could no longer be saved. The rot set in. 
 
When the attack on the premises of freedom of contract began in earnest ..., it became 
immediately clear that an objective theory of contract had already sown the seeds of its 
own destruction. The established principles of contract, the critics maintained, could no 
longer be defended as simple reflections of the will of the parties or of a ‘meeting of the 
minds’. Objectivism could not be reconciled with individual autonomy or voluntary 
agreement. In fact, it demonstrated that the existing law of contract had regularly 
subordinated individual freedom to collective determinations based on policy or justice. 
[This] prepared the way for those who wished to argue that the goals of intervention and 
regulation were already deeply embedded in the existing law and that the individualistic 
world of autonomous wills had long since passed from the scene.
128
  
 
What had started at first as a well-meaning attempt to objectivise the subjective by replacing the 
investigation of the real intent of the actual parties with the deductive reconstruction of the 
typical intent of the reasonable man, in the space of three generations brought on a wholesale 
revision of the way the entire legal system was conceptualised and experienced by its 
participants. The whole of private law as it had been traditionally understood increasingly began 
to look as nothing more than an emanation of public law.
129
 Out of the Procrustean strictures of 
Classical Legal Thought with its neat definitions and unbending binarisms, the modernist legal 
consciousness broke out into the brave new world of flexible conceptual categories, fluid 
pragmatism, and ever-deepening analytical confusion.  
 
g. Homologies and Divergences 
 
One can think of the century-long career of the will theory of contract as a metaphoric variation 
on the age-old narrative of the ‘Fall of Man’: the search for knowledge (rationalisation of the will 
theory) leads to the loss of innocence and the eventual fall from grace.
130
 Or, one can view it, as 
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shown below, as a kind of metaphoric pre-figuring of the Baudrillardian story of the rise of 
simulacra.
131
 Or, one can read it in terms of a Hegelian-style dialectical aufhebung. The 
opportunities are virtually limitless, but what is relevant for the purposes of the present 
discussion is the following three ideas.  
First, it would be tempting to project the evolutionary trajectory summarized above onto 
the historical past of the modern law of treaties, or at least to start looking for a parallel pattern in 
it on the implicit assumption that whatever happens in the law of contract most probably should 
also happen in the law of treaties. Tempting and by no means entirely unjustifiable, but also, it 
needs to be said, completely wrong. The will theory logic, broadly speaking, has never ‘gone 
away’ in international law. What is more, nothing suggests that it is about to any time soon. One 
only needs to recall how much emphasis the critics’ response to General Comment No. 24 placed 
on the principle of sovereign consent and the argument that parties should retain control over the 
meaning of the treaty, to see how deeply entrenched the legal-libertarian sensibility of 
autonomie de la volonté continues to remain in the contemporary international legal psyche.  
Second, the very idea that a pattern of such kind as described in the previous subsection 
should be expected to resurface in an entirely different legal order, as a general matter, has to be 
regarded with the utmost theoretical suspicion. Not only does it suggest, in the first instance, the 
deployment of what amounts to a deeply mystified and ideologically reactionary conception of 
history – something that one might typically expect from a medieval theologist bent on proving 
that the meaning of history lies beyond this world and therefore nothing of importance can ever 
be achieved by human action, so it would be better simply to resign to the way ‘things unfold 
themselves’132 – but also, on some very fundamental level, it seems to be premised on a 
categorical repudiation of the very project of the legal-historical inquiry as such. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, it effectively proposes that in order to understand the meaning of any changes 
taking place in any field of law one ultimately only needs to grasp the abstract logic of formal 
connections occurring between some kind of trans-legal meta-systemic factors (that are deemed 
to be always-already present within the law’s ‘material body’ like some sort of hidden seeds, 
genes, or dormant spirit) and the rest of the understanding will follow deductively. The general 
vision of history which this sort of hypothesis projects presents history essentially as a process 
whose endpoint is thus somehow always-already contained within its origin, a movement, in 
other words, that is always-already completed even as it may still be continuing/yet to begin.  
It would be difficult to imagine how one could write a meaningful legal-historical 
account starting from this sort of assumptions. One of the primary charges traditionally raised 
against the Marxist legal tradition was that it brutally reduced the plane of legal history to an 
epiphenomenal reflection of economic history. Given the richness of the Marxist tradition, that 
argument seems difficult on the whole to take seriously, but even in its most vulgar reductionist 
mode Marxist economism at least left the legal domain capable of experiencing some form of 
historical change.  
But then – and this is my third point – the ultimate theoretical value of any Historical 
account does not have to be sought in the discovery of trans-historical patterns directly 
transferable from one domain of historical experience to another. The story of the century-long 
demise of the will theory of contract is relevant to our present inquiry not inasmuch as it invites 
us to presume that it is also a story of the historical evolution of the modern law of treaties, but 
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inasmuch as it provides us with a certain set of theoretically useful reference points, viz., a 
sequence of model answers to the question ‘what makes a treaty’ and a basic sense of how each 
of these model answers ‘hangs together’.  
 
 
h. Divergences and Homologies  
 
 
Unsurprisingly, for a decentralized legal order whose ideological coherence is so directly 
premised on the ideology of the multiplicity of sovereignties, international law never found it 
possible to afford a formal overthrow of the Démoguean ‘autonomie de la volonté’.133 Indeed, 
even as a matter of abstract academic writing, it was not until well into the 1990s that 
mainstream international law scholarship threw up what could be regarded as a rather tentative 
exploration of what a post-objectivist way of thinking about treatymaking practice might look 
like.
134
  Even then, the ball that was put into play was then dropped almost at once, with no 
further notable breakthroughs having been made on the mainstream doctrinal front since.
135
  
Absent any bold doctrinal advancements or a general systemic trend spilling over from 
other fields, the law of treaties never acquired the right momentum to be able to develop 
anything approximating an openly modernist sensibility. But it has certainly had more than 
enough space to experiment with its version of the objectivist theory of contract, and the great 
classical opposition between the unanimity theory and the Pan-American approach and its 
subsequent supercession, in modern times, by the compatibility test serve as a very fitting 
testament to that fact.   
 
 
i. The Pan-American Approach: A General Characterisation 
 
 
Like the unanimity theory, the Pan-American approach offers a classic example of an untailored 
default rule. In its standard formulation, it held that where the multilateral treaty in question did 
not provide otherwise, the reserving State could become a party to that treaty irrespective of 
however many objections the other parties might raise to its reservation, on the condition that 
‘the convention would not [then enter] in force as between the reserving and the objecting 
States.’136 Put differently, in a mirror reversal of the unanimity theory’s presumption against 
reservations, the Pan-American approach advocated that any contracting State could make any 
reservation to any multilateral treaty subject to the condition that it would then become a party to 
it with the benefit of that reservation only with regard to those States that did not object against 
the reservation.
137
 With regard to the rest of the parties, the matter would have to be sorted on a 
case-by-case basis, but the general presumption would be that the objecting State was free not to 
recognise the reserving State as its treaty partner.  
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The result of such a switch between what in Hohfeldian terms would be called a no-right 
and a privilege
138
 at first glance seemed to lead to the achievement of a considerably more 
equitable balance between the bargaining positions of the reserving and the objecting States.
139
 
Nevertheless, the closer one looked at its entitlement distribution dynamics, the more apparent it 
became that in reality the Pan-American system was quite heavily tilted in favour of the former 
and strongly disfavoured the latter. Whereas the reserving State under the Pan-American 
approach acquired the same freedom with regard to its participation in a multilateral treaty as it 
would normally have with regard to its bilateral treaty relations, ‘[t]he only tool [that was left] in 
the hands of the objecting State [was] its ability to deny the entry into force of the treaty between 
itself and the reserving State’, which, presumably, would be the exact opposite of what it 
normally should be interested in, i.e. ‘ratification without the offending reservation.’140 
Looking at things from this angle, one may observe at this point that the most obvious 
structural difference between the Pan-American approach and the unanimity theory as model 
solutions to the question of background defaults to be adopted as part of the general law of 
reservations was the divergence in their vectors of default penalisation. Clearly, both models 
were designed to operate as penalty defaults. However, where the Pan-American approach 
created a ‘penalty’ for the objecting State, the unanimity theory penalised the reserving State. 
One does not need to go too deep into distributive impact theory to realise that such kind of 
structural divergence could not have come free of far-reaching implications, and indeed it did 
not.  
As indicated earlier, the use of penalty defaults not only reflects the lawmakers’ implicit 
understanding as to which contracting party is better placed to negotiate for a particular 
contingency ex ante but also their more systemic assumptions as to which types of informational 
asymmetries are less acceptable as a matter of public policy (and thus which types of rent-
seeking behaviour are more undesirable from the systemic point of view and ought, therefore, to 
be discouraged). By analysing the law’s distribution of penalty defaults through this prism it 
becomes possible to deduce not only how the proponents of the two models differed in their 
assessment of what made a cost-efficient dynamics in treatymaking, but also how they differed 
in their conceptions of how the treatymaking process was generally meant to work in terms of 
fairness, i.e. which actors were expected to act more opportunistically than others, what sort of 
decisional bottlenecks were supposed to have a more deleterious effect on international legal life, 
and so on and so forth. Seen in this light, the difference in the distribution of penalties between 
the unanimity theory and the Pan-American approach could be interpreted, broadly speaking, as 
an indication that whereas in the League practice it was the reserving State that was usually 
expected to abuse the multilateral process in ways that in the larger scheme of things were 
deemed fundamentally undesirable, in the Pan-American practice it was the objecting State that 
was not trusted to ‘play fair’ or act in a communally beneficial way.  
Thus, in the former case, the undesirable rent-seeking behaviour that the lawmakers 
would aim to prevent would have been something like ‘joining a treaty regime while only 
intending to accept a portion of its obligations’. The normal time delay which occurs between 
signing and ratifying the treaty, of course, opened the space for exactly this kind of strategic 
manoeuvring. And, of course, no other party with the exception of the reserving State would 
usually be privy to its intentions to exploit that possibility. Structuring the default rule on 
reservations in the way in which the unanimity theory proposed allowed under these 
circumstances to force the reserving State to ‘reveal its hand’ right from the outset (and thus 
eliminate the possibility for any undeserved gains it could extract) by compelling it either to 
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insist on inserting in the respective treaty a differently structured reservations rule or to disclose 
its intentions not to accept the full package while everyone was still at the negotiating table.  
By contrast, in the case of the Pan-American rule, the basic impression created by the 
penalty’s structure suggests that the undesirable behaviour which the lawmakers sought to 
prevent was the objecting State’s blockage of the reserving State’s intention to join a multilateral 
regime on grounds that objectively would have nothing to do with the regime itself. Given that 
the objecting State would be able to withhold its consent to a reservation for no reason other than 
it so desired, the reserving State would have no way of knowing whether or not its reservation 
would be blocked until the moment when this happened. From a practical point of view, what 
this meant was that the reserving State would then be placed at the mercy of the objecting State, 
which obviously went against the principle of sovereign equality. As the arbitral tribunal in the 
Jesse Lewis case observed, ‘the fundamental principle of the juridical equality of States’, whose 
principal thrust was to preclude ‘placing one State under the jurisdiction of another State’, 
‘opposed to the subjection of one State to an interpretation of a Treaty asserted by another 
State.’141  
By awarding the reserving State the Hohfeldian privilege to join the treaty if it so wished 
with whatever reservations it might desire to make so long as whichever other contracting parties 
that did not object to that reservation were ready to enter into treaty relations with it, the Pan-
American approach removed the objecting State’s capacity to veto the reservation at the last 
moment, thus forcing it either to push for the adoption of a different treaty-specific reservations 
regime right from the start, or to have to lobby all its treaty partners one by one to convince them 
to reject the proposed reservation. In either scenario, whatever informational advantage the 
objecting State might have with regard to its knowledge of its intentions would be cancelled out.  
A model that distrusts reservations versus a model that distrusts responses to them – it 
may be tempting to start speculating which of the two would be better-suited to the realities of 
international life, and indeed numerous commentators had done exactly that, but for our present 
purposes going down the same route would miss the most important point about the classical law 
of reservations. Whether one thinks of this in terms of ‘legal consciousness’, ‘professional 
sensibility’, or a Weltanschaung, the doctrinal-theoretical foundations behind the classical law of 
reservations by the end of the interwar period had clearly grown sufficiently sophisticated in 
structural terms to be able not only to accommodate directly opposing policy visions but also to 
lend both of them considerable ideological support when they came into open conflict with one 
another. The observation may not seem particularly riveting at first, but what it signals is actually 
rather striking. Rhetorical flexibility leading on to theoretical eclecticism, agnostic pragmatism 
verging on ideological disorientation, unmistakable crystallization of the langue/parole divide
142
 
– one would be hard-pressed to find a more telling sign of the implicit onset of the modernist 
stage in the evolution of the law of reservations.  
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j. The Evolution of the Will Theory Reconsidered: the Rise of Simulacra and the Symptomatology 
of Modernism  
 
 
The history of signification, noted Baudrillard famously, has essentially been the history of the 
movement from the logic of representation to the logic of simulation. The former ‘stems from 
the principle of the equivalence of the sign and the real (even if this equivalence is utopia, it is a 
fundamental axiom).’ The latter, on the other hand, ‘stems from the utopia of the principle of 
equivalence, from the radical negation of sign as value.’143  
Once again, there appears to be no need to presume any kind of direct transferability for 
this theoretical model in the context of legal historiography to see its basic heuristic relevance. 
Undoubtedly, it would make things a lot more entertaining if one did ‘discover’ such a 
transferability, but even without projecting any supra-historical homologies between the two 
planes of events it seems to be possible to extrapolate a whole series of highly useful insights 
into the basic internal rhythm governing the century-long rise and fall of the will theory of 
contract by studying the implicit structures underpinning Baudrillard’s account.  
The operative logic of representation, so viewed, one might say, could be considered a 
metaphoric equivalent for the subjectivist theory of contract. Under representation, the dominant 
conception of semantics revolved around the belief that the meaning of every sign was external 
to its apparent form, that is to say, it was determined by the objective condition of whatever 
element of the outside reality it purported to describe. In a similar vein, in the age of Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus, the basic assumption behind the will theory of contract held that the meaning of 
every contract was external to its immediate material manifestation, since it was governed by the 
substantive content of the contracting parties’ meeting of the minds. The fact that the role of the 
outside reality in this context was assigned to what is a quintessentially ideal phenomenon does 
not, of course, undo the force of the analogy, but only highlights the highly peculiar structurally 
inverted character of the subjectivist mindset. Like the logic of representation, the logic of the 
subjectivist theory rested on the assumption of an ontologically dualist structure of existence 
between the two parts of which it posited a relationship of equivalence and external 
subordination. The only difference was that in the case of representation one would go on to 
objectify what appears to be some form of sensual reality, while in the case of the subjectivist 
theory the object of objectification was a deductively inferred set of ‘psychological facts’.  
In the same way, the logic of simulation could also be seen as a metaphoric equivalent of 
the modernist demise of the will theory of contract. By the time the evolution of the contract law 
doctrine reaches the stage to Atiyah’s ‘boarding of the bus’ contracts, every trace of that old 
assumption of direct equivalence between the contract and the underlying meeting of the minds 
is erased. The legal operability of the contract is conceptualised on the basis of a fuzzily monist 
ontological structure: what makes a contract is decided now solely within the same plane of legal 
reality in which the contract itself exists.  
Like signs which under the logic of simulation only refer to other signs, the concept of 
contract under modernism refers to a legal phenomenon whose realisation represents nothing 
more than the effect of the formal interaction between other legal phenomena. Put differently, 
just like the logic of simulation stems from the vision of a perfectly autopoetic semantic process 
governed exclusively by its own immanent laws, so too the ontological foundations behind the 
modernist theory of contract indicate the field’s progressive collapse into the dynamics of pure 
immanent difference and solipsism.  
One can continue tracing the similarities, but pause for a second now and reflect instead 
on this. From the traditional Marxist perspective, the transition from the semiotics of 
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representation to the semiotics of simulation would usually be regarded as a field-specific 
illustration of the more general historical process of the rise of commodity fetishism and the 
resultant spread of the all-encompassing logic of reification.
144
 But for Baudrillard the main 
essence of the noted trajectory should be sought much less in the fact that it might be somehow 
connected to the evolution of capitalism but rather in the fact that it represents an ineluctable 
process of disintegration. What is more, looking from this angle, how exactly one conceptualises 
the ultimate object of disintegration would seem to be not nearly as important as the actual 
syntagma of the suggested movement, which, as Baudrillard notes, appears at first sight to be 
unproblematically linear, but in reality is actually neither unproblematic nor linear, nor indeed 
directionally stable. Depending on which end of the trajectory one looks from, in other words, 
not only does the length of this movement of disintegration seem to differ but also its basic shape 
and structure. The reason behind this, as Baudrillard implies, lies most probably in the fact that 
the implied process does not actually unfold in empty time: both the earlier stage and the later 
stage to a very considerable degree overlap; both also seek to ‘rewrite’ the sequence of transition 
between them. In the first case, the intended effect appears to be to roll history back, in the 
second case, to extend the revolutionary shift progressively further into the past.  
Faced with what they see as a debilitating bastardisation of semantics, observes 
Baudrillard, the supporters of the representation mode angrily strike out against all forms of 
simulation. Thus, in effect, ‘representation attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a 
false representation’.145  
Faced with what they saw as a nihilist attempt to destroy the law of private obligations, 
conservative contract law theorists from the 1950s onwards have sought to bring back not only 
the classical 19
th
-century doctrines but the Démoguean ‘autonomie de la volonté’ itself. The 
advent of the modernist stage in contract law did not just bring the ‘death of contract’ thesis146 or 
the birth of the ‘relational theory of contract’.147 A whole swathe of works penned by 
conservative scholars were rushed to the printers,
 148
 partly in the hope of resuscitating the 
subjectivist mythology, partly in the hope of reversing every objectivist and modernist advance 
since Holmes.
149
 Pushed to its logical conclusion, this impulse sought not only to imbue the 
demise of the will theory with a heavy moralising tone but also to undo its historical facticity as 
such. It was as though because the demise of the will theory had led to the loss of moral 
rectitude/rise of nihilism, the argument went that it was necessary therefore that it had never 
actually happened: what took place instead had to be seen as only a temporary digression.  
Like with most conservative projects, the element of denial no doubt played a very 
important ideological role in that situation. But, as Baudrillard’s remark suggests again, this is 
not the only fact that was genuinely noteworthy about this particular conservative project. To 
regard representation’s attempt to denounce simulation as an act of self-serving ideologisation 
may serve a valid critical purpose, but in the present context it also helps to distract the attention 
from the essential character of the implicit historiographic vision hidden behind this attempt. 
Note once more Baudrillard’s choice of language: representation seeks to absorb simulation, to 
convert it from a stage of history to a digression, to replace a diachronic supersession with a 
synchronic variation. The general sense of historical time that Baudrillard seems to try to evoke 
here appears to be strongly reminiscent of the essentially quasi-theological concept of non-
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directional history of the kind that at one time underpinned the constitutional-theoretical 
discourse in ancient Greece.  
As Koselleck notes, what today one would call the constitutional law tradition in ancient 
Greece developed, strictly speaking, without any explicit theory of history. Nevertheless, through 
their discussions of the immanent patterns of constitutional evolution, various figures in that 
tradition projected over the years a rather striking conception of historical motion. The work of 
Darius, in particular, seems to have played a central role:  
 
While the protagonists of aristocracy and democracy each sought to highlight their 
own constitutions by proving the injuriousness of the others, Darius proceeded 
differently: he showed the immanent process by which each democracy and 
aristocracy was eventually led by its own internal disorders to monarchy. From this 
he concluded that monarchy should be introduced immediately, since it not only was 
the best constitutional form but would in any case prevail over time.
 150
  
 
The immediate logic of the move may not seem particularly relevant, but what appears at first to 
have been only a political argument, remarks Koselleck, on closer inspection turns out also to 
have been an implicit projection of a ‘specifically historical’ vision, one in which the central 
business of politics becomes to evade the threat of the natural decline of society by the ‘skilful 
management’ of mixed constitutional forms.151 Note what sort of presuppositions the assumption 
of such a vision involves about the ontological character of the historical process. Darius’s 
suggestion that the ‘unavoidable’ future form should be brought into existence already today 
reflects in its bare logic the same belief in the power of the political will to remould the course of 
history that tacitly underpins the conservative contract law theorists’ attempt to bring back the 
subjectivist model of the will theory of contract. It is the belief in history as a kind of a cassette-
player. For Darius, the primary goal was to convince his audience that the course of historical 
events could be sped up and fast-forwarded; for the conservative contract law theorists, that it 
could be reversed and rewinded. The vector of the movement is different, but the structure of the 
logical operation is essentially the same, as are, inevitably, the corresponding metaphysical 
implications: wherever one finds the belief in the rewind function, one also finds the belief in the 
Great Rewinder, the He who is both at the beginning and at the end, the transcendental subject 
that stands outside and above the stream of time, the eternal mover that cannot be moved himself 
– God.  
In the same way in which representation seeks to deny the historical facticity of the rise 
of simulation, simulation seeks to downplay the essential ‘reality’ of the representational mode. 
The ultimate aim behind the exercise, as Baudrillard puts it, is to ‘envelop[] the whole edifice of 
representation itself as a simulacrum’.152  
The distinguishing feature of the modernist version of historical revisionism, as compared 
to that favoured by the conservative camp, is that it aims to recast the whole history of the 
transition from representation to simulation either as part of the internal history of simulation 
itself or, better still, as a simulationist construct par excellence: an ‘invented tradition’, a lie, a 
memory of a past that never was. The pattern, though not always obvious, can be easily traced in 
the works of modernist legal historiographers.  
If one looks at the history of 20
th
 century contract law historiography, one of the main 
distinctions between the histories of the field that were written in the objectivist period and those 
that were developed during the modernist age, one of the first things that jumps to one’s attention 
as one sets out to compare the two discursive traditions, is that the latter, by and large, always 
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seek to demonstrate that the subjectivist age, firstly, did not last quite as long as the writers of the 
objectivist period would have you believe, that even at the time of its alleged supremacy the 
meeting-of-the-minds doctrine had not, in fact, been taken nearly as seriously as was 
traditionally assumed; and that, secondly, the very idea of there ever being a subjectivist period 
is itself open to doubt. For all we know, it may well have been nothing more than a scholarly 
invention concocted by the late-objectivist period historians whose ultimate meaning can only be 
grasped in the context of the internal politics of the late-objectivist historiography but not, in any 
meaningful sense, in the context of the ‘objective’ historical development of contract law 
practices as such.
153
  
Unsurprisingly, the more convincing this argument begins to sound, the more the 
underlying sense of the background historical timeline starts to collapse into an essentially anti-
historicist concept of history. To be sure, compared to the conservative example, the dominant 
accent in this case has a completely different inflexion: the ruling model for the modernist 
revisionist exercise is not Darius but the (in)famous ‘linguistic turn’ (‘everything is just a 
discourse’; ‘there is no outside of text’). But the implicit ontology is still the same: history as an 
objective process is an impossibility. When everything turns into a language game, notes 
Baudrillard, reality itself becomes theoretically unthinkable. Once you cannot tell what sets 
‘fiction’ apart from ‘truth’, to ‘isolate the process of the real’ turns into an epistemic 
impossibility.
154
 The circle closes: simulation envelops everything as itself a form of a 
simulacrum.  
And yet, one has to note, such is the logic of the process only when it is perceived 
‘experientially’, i.e. from inside the historiographic process itself. If, on the other hand, it should 
be approached ‘from the outside’, if, in other words, one should treat Baudrillard’s hypothesis as 
a source of theoretical insights that could potentially be converted into useful analytical 
instruments but not as a truth-fiction account that must either be accepted as such or rejected, the 
situation appears to be completely different. Looking at things from this angle, what then comes 
out, in fact, is the following quadripartite structure of ‘ideal types’ of onto-theoretical modes, or 
as Baudrillard calls them,    
 
the successive phases of the image: 
- it is the reflection of a profound reality; 
- it masks and denatures a profound reality; 
- it masks the absence of a profound reality; 
- it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.  
In the first case, the image is a good appearance – representation is of the 
sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance – it is of the order of 
maleficence. In the third, it plays at being an appearance – it is of the order of 
sorcery. In the fourth, it is no longer of the order of appearances, but of 
simulacrum.
155
  
 
The first formula closely resembles the subjectivist version of the will theory. Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus: a contract is a representation of the invisible ‘meeting of the minds’ which acts as 
its profound reality and the exclusive source of its ‘truth’. The second formula parallels the 
Holmesean revision of the doctrine: ‘The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the 
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parties’ minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their 
conduct.’156 Retain the language of the subjectivist approach, but use instead a completely 
different theory of contract-making practice, denature the concept of the communion of the wills 
by replacing the real intentions of the actual parties with the external formalities conveying the 
apparent intentions of an ‘average man of ordinary intelligence and prudence’.  
The third formula is the post-Holmesean rationalism of Corbin and Williston: the external 
formalities are not just an evidence of some mystical thought process, they are themselves the 
relevant operative acts; the use of the language of voluntary transactions is retained to mask the 
fact that no voluntarism is really required anymore for a contract to be created in the eyes of the 
law. The fourth formula, finally, is an expression of Atiyah’s modernist disintegration: even as a 
matter of official hypocrisy, one does not anymore assume that behind the legal reality of the 
contract there should be anything even remotely approximating the communion of free 
contracting wills. Indeed, by this stage, it would not ‘matter a whit’ if this were actually admitted 
in the open.  
So far, so good, but note also another important insight hidden behind all these 
parallelisms. An abstract deduction it is, nothing more, to be sure, but what it signals, 
nevertheless, is a potentially very powerful insight into how the demise of the will theory might 
have actually been sequenced in logical terms, an insight that, if deployed comparatively, could 
be used to get around the earlier noted epistemic obstacle raised by international law’s seeming 
inability to admit the end of the Démoguean ‘autonomie de la volonté’. Here is that insight: the 
‘decisive turning point’ in the dialectical movement from representations to simulacra, notes 
Baudrillard, does not take place between the third and the fourth stages. Rather, it comes 
between the second and the third: ‘the transition from signs that dissimulate something to signs 
that dissimulate that there is nothing’ is the real start of the logic of simulation.157  
Could it be that the real shift from the ‘rise’ to the ‘fall’ stages in the history of the will 
theory came somewhere between Holmes and Corbin? The brief overview sketched out above 
certainly seems to support this view. If that is so, however, then what it appears to tell us about 
the general symptomatology of the onset of modernism – Corbin’s main difference from Holmes 
was his lack of interest in proving why it was appropriate to link external acts to internal 
intentions and his endorsement of the idea that the general shape of contract law in practice is 
defined by considerations of public policy – should carry some rather far-reaching implications 
for the genealogical study of the modern law of treaties.  
 
k. What the Logic of the Will Theory Reveals about the Hidden Contradictions of the Unanimity 
Theory 
 
 
The divergence in the choice of penalized parties was not the only noteworthy difference 
between the unanimity theory and the Pan-American approach. No less significant was also the 
difference in their underlying conceptions of the fundamental operative logic of treaties as legal 
regimes. A good starting point in demonstrating how this difference played out in practice is to 
analyse the way in which the unanimity theory conceived the relationship between the objective 
regime of the treaty and its apparent foundation in the subjective bargain between the contracting 
parties encoded into its continuous insistence on protecting the ‘integrity’ of the alleged treaty 
commitment. 
Characteristically, most of the discussion so far has focused on exploring the implications 
of the relative restrictiveness of the unanimity theory vis-à-vis the Pan-American approach. And 
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yet, if we think about this carefully, the very fact that the unanimity theory allows for the 
possibility of reservations in the first place should be certainly considered a no less revealing 
feature of this model. For, indeed, in a theoretical tradition that is meant to be so closely wedded 
to the notion of protecting the integrity of the original bargain, the proposition that reservations 
may be admissible at all is not, in fact, self-evident.  
Consider the argument: the official theory behind the unanimity model holds that the 
principal reason why reservations require the unanimous consent of all other contracting parties 
comes down, in the end, to the need to ensure that the parties get ‘what they bargained for’ since 
otherwise the rationale behind having such multilateral treaties would be ‘impaired’ and maybe 
even ‘destroyed’.158 The reasoning sequence that leads up to this conclusion runs more or less 
along the following lines: every multilateral treaty represents ‘a balanced, integrated whole’;159 
once it has been drawn up it becomes like a package deal – any attempt to remove any element 
of the package risks frustrating the object of the deal; in order so that this does not happen, 
whenever a reservation that has not been factored into the original agreement is proposed, the 
law must require that it be examined by all the contracting parties and receive their unanimous 
assent.  
Now, the idea of protecting the bargain is, of course, a quintessential subjectivist trope: 
the notion that there exists behind the surface reality of a treaty some kind of ontologically 
separate entity (the ‘package deal’) whose integrity the law is meant to protect presupposes as its 
operative premises precisely the kind of metaphysical conception of contract-making which 
characterised the Raffles v. Wichelhaus approach. And yet, an indispensable precondition of 
adopting such a conception of treaty law would also have to be the idea that the constitution of 
every treaty not only comprises an essentially indivisible act
160
  but is at the same time a 
perfectly singular event:
161
 once the minds of the contracting parties have met, the prerequisite 
‘consensus ad idem’ is achieved, and at this precise point – and only at this point – the treaty as a 
legal fact comes into existence and no subsequent evolution is now conceivable. Any amendment 
would have to obtains its own ‘meeting of the minds’ foundation, i.e. its own foundational 
bargain and thus, technically speaking, give rise to its own, separate treaty arrangement.  
It seems instructive at this point to recall that the argument in defence of the unanimity 
theory’s approach to the issue of reservations has also sometimes been made by way of drawing 
an analogy with post-negotiations accessions. If a party that did not take part in the original 
negotiations decided to accede to a multilateral treaty (the new arrival scenario), it would 
obviously have to take it exactly as it is or negotiate a completely new treaty altogether. Given 
that the only situation where the question of reservations can arise is when the original 
negotiations are over and the reserving State still decides to reopen the deal, why not use the 
same approach for reservations? An eminently reasonable argument, it would seem. But pause 
for a moment now and think through its reasoning again. If one really takes the theory of the 
‘consensus ad idem’ seriously, one should be able to contemplate the possibility of any new 
arrivals at all. Whatever the original parties’ meeting of the minds would have covered, it 
certainly was a meeting only between their minds. The agreement that was thus concluded, 
therefore, can only exist between these original parties. Allowing for any new arrivals to be 
added to the treaty in question, under these circumstances would effectively be tantamount to an 
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invitation for a new meeting of the minds to take place, that is to say for a new treaty to be 
brought into existence.
162
  
Given this logic, however, given, that is, the idea that every attempt to propose a 
reservation that was not negotiated at the drafting stage is effectively similar to a request for a 
post-negotiations accession and every request for a post-negotiations accession is effectively 
tantamount to an invitation for a new ‘meeting of the minds’, there seems to be no actual reason 
to insist on any form of unanimity requirement. Why should the new ‘meeting of the minds’ 
proposed by way of an attempt to attach a reservation not be allowed to include fewer than all of 
the original parties? If reservations belong in the same category as offers to conclude a new 
treaty, there exists no legitimate reason to give the parties to the ‘old treaty’ any say over who 
can join the ‘new treaty’. Put differently, there exists no reason to allow any reservations at all, 
since any acceptance of a reservation would automatically trigger a new ‘meeting of the minds’ 
and a new ‘meeting of the minds’ has to find its ‘own’ treaty document through which to be 
formally expressed instead of piggy-backing onto another meeting’s treaty.   
To put the matter more formally, looking at its operative logic, it appears that either the 
unanimity model, contrary to what its official theory holds, did not actually care that much about 
preserving the ‘integrity of the bargain’ behind the treaty (i.e. it consistently ‘lied’ about its 
intentions) or it was just very bad at doing what it set out to do (i.e. it was deeply mistaken about 
the nature of its strategic task). Or, which seems much more likely, there exists, in fact, no other 
way to justify the unanimity requirement than on the grounds of Corbinesque ‘considerations of 
public policy’, which, of course, can only mean that in terms of its practical operation the 
unanimity model firmly belongs in the objectivist tradition of the will theory; and, given that its 
basic repertoire of justificatory tropes seems nevertheless to be lifted from the subjectivist 
tradition, it, again, must have either consistently ‘lied’ or was deeply mistaken about its self-
image. In either case, as a piece of legal-regime-modelling it was obviously riddled with a 
fundamental design contradiction, or, to use a somewhat catchier term, a Great Structural Rift.  
 
 
l. The Pan-American Approach as a Formal Expression of the Objectivist Sensibility 
 
 
The contrast could not have been starker in the case of the Pan-American approach. Positing a 
default rule whose substantive contents directly challenged the operative assumptions of 
subjectivism, the Pan-American model projected a conception of treaty ontology that indicated a 
no less decisive break with the subjectivist sensibility.  
Consider once more the general implications that flow from the idea of treaties as 
‘package deals’. As soon as one accepts as a given the proposition that every treaty agreement is 
a ‘balanced and integrated whole’, the most ‘obvious’ next move is to reify the underlying 
phenomenon of the contractual bargain so as to separate for the purposes of the practical analysis 
the ‘external’ reality of the treaty from the ‘internal’ reality of the agreement. Once this move is 
completed, it only becomes a matter of a very small step before one arrives at the notion of 
privileging the latter over the former on the grounds that the internal represents the true and the 
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 The moment 
the external reality of the treaty becomes normatively subordinated to the internal reality of the 
‘underpinning’ bargain, one arrives into the world of theological reasoning. Enter natural law 
and everything else that flows from it. 
Contrast this pattern now with that adopted in the Pan-American approach. As soon as 
one discards the package-deal mentality, the most obvious analytical progression becomes to 
move towards a thorough re-conceptualisation of the whole treatymaking process along broadly 
functionalist lines. From the idea of treaties as reflections of ‘things’ (deals, bargains, ‘meetings 
of the minds’), the implicit understanding gradually shifts towards the idea of treaties as 
foundations of positive legal regimes constructed by the assortment of such bundles of rights and 
duties as have been specified in the texts of the treaties themselves. Put differently, one gradually 
comes to regard treaties as conduct-shaping frameworks of behavioural incentives. Taken as 
objective phenomena, treaties then come to be experienced and perceived both by their 
participants and by external observers no longer as reified solid entities but as relatively flexible 
open-format structures: enabling contexts or platforms for the development of dynamic 
interactive environments between their respective parties.  
As soon as this conceptual transition starts, the theoretical foundations of treaty law 
ineluctably begin to shift regardless of how much faith one may still have (as a matter of one’s 
explicitly articulated theoretical beliefs) in the doctrine of the ‘meeting of the minds’. In its 
subjectivist dimension the theoretical conception evolves in the following way: if every 
multilateral treaty is effectively now perceived as a conduct-shaping framework in the context of 
which each participating State, if it so sees fit, can choose to build any number of different 
regimes of legal relations between itself and its contracting partners, there remains no good 
reason to prevent the conclusion that if it should decide to achieve this goal by submitting, 
accepting, challenging, or negotiating reservations, then so be it.  In the objectivist dimension the 
evolution proceeds thusly: if treaties, as a matter of fact, are not treated as direct representations 
of their parties’ actual intentions, but every treaty, on the other hand, does at the same time 
constitute a bundle of legally enforceable rights and duties, then the question of which rights and 
duties will be enforceable in the context of any given treaty is, in the final analysis, always a 
function of what the broader regime of international law ‘has to say’ on that subject, as a matter 
of public policy considerations. If this should be the case, however, then insofar as the question 
of reservations must also be part of that bundle, it ought to be true then also that if the broader 
regime of international law should choose to privilege some other policy consideration over the 
idea that the contracting parties are the supreme masters of their treaty, then the default rule on 
reservations could also, perfectly legitimately, be formulated with a view to the enactment of that 
other policy. Since, as a matter of fact, it so happens that the broader regime of international law 
has become concerned with encouraging ever-broader participation in multilateral treaty regimes 
as well as preventing ‘the subjection of one State to an interpretation of a Treaty asserted by 
another State’, it can be safely deduced that the most appropriate way to organise the default 
regime on reservations would be to increase the reserving State’s scope of freedom and remove 
the objecting State’s power of veto over its accession.  
The sense of progression – and rupture – is unmistakable: between the unanimity 
approach with its inherent sense of contradictoriness and its Great Structural Rift and the Pan-
American model whose whole structure exudes objectivist sensibility on its every level lie not 
just a few years but a whole paradigmatic shift. In Hegelian terms, one could say this is 
equivalent to the difference between the murky dawn of reason and its brightest noon, between 
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Thought that is still struggling against its own self-estrangement and Thought that has become 
fully one with itself, between contradiction and self-becoming.  
Or one could simply say this is equivalent to Baudrillard’s ‘decisive turning point’.  
  
SECTION 4. THE MODERN LAW OF RESERVATIONS: THE EMPTY HOPES AND THE IRRESOLVABLE 
ANTINOMIES OF THE COMPATIBILITY TEST APPROACH 
 
 
a. The Rise of the Compatibility Test Approach 
 
 
Few cases have acquired such an iconic status in the history of modern international law as the 
Reservations case. The background story behind it has been told numerous times.
165
 At some 
point following the adoption of the Genocide Convention, one group of States expressed the 
intention to join the Convention while making a reservation to its Article IX. Another group of 
States protested against this. The dispute went to the General Assembly, under the auspices of 
which the Genocide Convention was originally adopted. The Assembly decided it could not 
resolve the matter on its own and, after a short hesitation, referred the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice under the guise of a request for an advisory opinion.  
The terms of the referral read as follows:   
 
in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the Convention subject to a 
reservation … can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the 
Convention while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to 
by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others? If [yes], what is 
the effect of the reservation as between the reserving State and: (a) the parties 
which object to the reservation? (b those which accept it?
166
 
 
Half a year after receiving the request, the Court delivered its decision. On the first question, the 
answer was unequivocally in the affirmative. On the second question, the Court took the position 
that whereas between the accepting State and the reserving State the treaty would have to operate 
subject to the proposed reservation, the effect of the reservation as between the reserving State 
and the objecting State depended essentially on the latter’s decision. If the objecting State so 
desired it was at liberty to consider that the treaty did not enter into force between itself and the 
reserving State. A rather straightforward endorsement of the Pan-American model it would seem 
at first glance, but, as has so often been the case with the Court’s decisions, on closer inspection 
things turned out to be nowhere near as simple.  
Let us return briefly to the actual text of the Court’s decision.  
Certainly, begins the operative part of the ratio, it seems to be a very well-established 
principle of international law that no State can be bound in its treaty relations without its express 
consent, and so no reservation, therefore, can be made ‘effective against any State without its 
agreement thereto.’167 Equally, as a result of the same argument it follows that when it came to 
multilateral conventions ‘none of the contracting parties [should be] entitled to frustrate or 
impair, by means of unilateral decisions or particular agreements, the purpose and raison d’être 
of the convention’. After all, such a convention ‘is the result of an agreement freely concluded 
upon its clauses’.168 If a given State chose to accede to a multilateral convention, it would have 
to abide by every one of its provisions. For, otherwise, why did it decide to join that convention 
in the first place? Nobody forces it to accept what it did not agree to.  
So far, so rather predictable: composed primarily of old-school international lawyers, the 
Court, rather unsurprisingly, seems to side with the supporters of the old-school approach. The 
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presence of the package-deal metaphor, the repeated allusion to the principle of consent, the 
implicit reduction of the operative logic of treaty-making to the single thesis of the freedom of 
contract all act as something of a barometer. The movement of the argument seems unmistakable 
– but only for a few lines. Already at the start of the next paragraph, the Court makes a sudden 
U-turn: the unanimity approach, it declares, is rooted in the view that all treaties by their nature 
are like contracts, whereas the immediate circumstances of the Genocide Convention quite 
clearly indicate that this is not at all the case in the present context.  
Firstly, unlike most treaties, the Court remarks, the Genocide Convention was concluded 
under the auspices of an international organisation that has ‘a clearly universal character’.169 
From its very design it seems obvious that it was thus meant to attract a ‘very wide degree of 
participation’.170 Secondly, an ‘extensive participation in conventions of this type has already 
given rise to [a great deal of] flexibility in the international practice’.171 In particular, a 
completely new pattern of State practice seem to have arisen in recent years ‘which go[es] so far 
as to admit that the author of reservations which have been rejected by certain contracting parties 
[can] nevertheless … be regarded as a party to the convention in relation to those contracting 
parties that have accepted the reservations.’172  
Thirdly, because the text of the Convention was adopted in the General Assembly by a 
series of majority votes, it seems reasonable to assume that the traditional unanimist view that 
the text of the treaty as adopted represents exactly what its parties agreed on should no longer be 
accepted as accurate. If both the principle of consent and the operative logic of the actual 
procedure by which the Convention was brought into existence are to be taken seriously, it 
would seem to follow that those States which in different rounds of voting had found themselves 
on the wrong side of the majority vote should be allowed at least some kind of leeway when it 
comes to accepting those parts of the Convention to which they did not, in fact, agree, which the 
unanimity theory, quite evidently, would not support.
173
  
Fourthly, it also bears reminding that the Convention was not actually designed in the 
form of a typical contract. Its principal object is to ‘safeguard the very existence of certain 
human groups and … to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality’. It has 
nothing to say about the immediate relations between its signatory parties per se, since in 
conventions of such kind ‘the contracting States do not have any interests of their own’. This 
means that one cannot really speak in this case of any kind of reciprocational dynamics, that is to 
say, it would be entirely specious to look at this type of conventions from the position of trying 
to maintain ‘a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties.’174  
Add all of this together and it seems to be beyond doubt, concludes the Court, that 
everything about the Genocide Convention requires that as many States as possible should be 
allowed to participate in it and the Convention itself should not be used to preclude this. 
Adopting the unanimity approach would almost certainly prejudice the achievement of this 
objective. If only on that ground alone the unanimity theory, therefore, has to be decisively 
rejected:   
 
The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only 
restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral 
and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the 
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contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation 
should produce such a result.
 175
   
 
Once again, the movement of the argument appears pretty obvious. Having dismissed the 
unanimity model because of its excessive rigidity and simplicity of its theoretical assumptions, 
the Court goes on first to explain the unique character of the Genocide Convention, then 
pointedly acknowledges the emergence of anti-unanimist patterns in customary international law, 
before explaining how complex the process of multilateral negotiations has become in modern 
practice and developing on that basis a policy argument that unmistakably seems to point 
towards the endorsement of the Pan-American approach. But then, once more, comes the abrupt 
U-turn.  
In the sentence immediately following the last quoted passage, just after the point where 
it notes how inconceivable it would be that the drafters of the Genocide Convention readily 
contemplated that an aspiring party could be turned away on the sole basis that one of the other 
parties did not like its reservation, the Court curiously adds: ‘But even less could the contracting 
parties have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour of a vain desire to 
secure as many participants as possible.’176  
Like the unanimity theory, it turns out the Pan-American approach is also far too 
‘contractualist’ in its attitude for the Court’s liking. Luckily for the Assembly, however, the 
Court may just have the perfect solution for that flaw.  
The key, as it hinted in an earlier passage, is to recall the unique ‘object and purpose’ of 
the Genocide Convention. Every reservation proposed to this treaty should be assessed in the 
light of its potential impact on these ‘object and purpose’.  
 
It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of 
the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the 
reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the 
reservation.  Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal 
which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of 
any reservation.
177
 
  
And that was that. What followed afterwards should not have been that difficult to foresee. Most 
old-school international lawyers found the new compatibility test approach deeply 
unsatisfactory. Some of them sought to curtail the judgment’s precedent-creating effect by 
arguing that the Court’s reasoning had no real foundation either in the text of the Convention 
itself (good point) or in the broader patterns of state practice (another good point); others 
proposed that the new model was only meant to apply in the case of the Genocide Convention 
(possibly true) and so did not necessarily extend to other treaties (totally unconvincing).
178
 Both 
strategies had their strengths and their weaknesses. In the long run, neither of them seems to have 
worked. The first argument proved entirely ineffective for the simple age-old reason that 
between a scholarly argument and a judicial decision, the latter always has a far stronger 
‘sticking potential’.179 The second argument fared only marginally better, leaving a faint 
rhetorical trace that managed to survive in some rarefied academic contexts
180
 but has been 
otherwise completely ignored in State practice.  
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Within the space of the next several years, the compatibility test approach took off not 
just in the context of the Genocide Convention but for all other multilateral treaties too. The UN 
Secretariat adopted it into its practice. The International Law Commission incorporated it into 
the draft of the future Vienna Convention. By the end of the following decade, there was nothing 
its critics could do about it anymore.  
Not that this meant any of its substantive flaws had somehow been cured – quite on the 
contrary. 
 
 
b. The First Antinomy of the Compatibility Test Approach  
 
 
Earlier it has been noted how closely the internal logic of the compatibility test depends on the 
operative assumptions of the permissibility theory. Looking at the manner in which the Court 
built its argument in the Reservations opinion, one can immediately notice now that these 
assumptions were, in fact, all that separated the compatibility test approach from the Pan-
American approach. Indeed, as many Latin American lawyers noticed, the compatibility test 
model differed from the Pan-American model only inasmuch as it presumed that the question of 
every given reservation’s validity could be answered by consulting the respective treaty itself 
rather than the opinions of its contracting parties.
181
 This shift in assumptions, of course, is 
precisely what separates the permissibility school from the opposability school. Given what has 
been said earlier about the latent logic of the permissibility view – that it relies on an essentially 
natural-legalistic concept of legal interpretation and that it does not sit very well with the idea of 
a decentralized legal process – it should not be difficult to work out what sort of epistemological 
and ontological implications the move to the compatibility model triggered in the doctrinal fabric 
of the law of reservations.  
Consider, first, the epistemological implications. Under the Pan-American approach, the 
question of whether or not a given reservation was valid was essentially treated as a question of 
fact: the inquiry started and ended with taking note of other contracting parties’ reactions, 
objections, and acquiescences. Under the compatibility test model, by contrast, the evaluative 
process on the whole is structured decidedly in the shape of a deductive-style logical operation. 
Firstly, in order to verify which reservations are admissible and which are not, the model 
requires the legal decision-maker to look ‘inwards’, into the ideational landscape of treaty law, 
rather than ‘outwards’, into the sociological domain of diplomatic acts. Secondly, in order to 
establish what precise content this ideational landscape has in each particular case, it requires the 
decision-maker again rather than turning outwards, into the domain of State practice, to 
extrapolate the answer from the underlying aims and objectives of the respective legal-ideational 
framework, be it the combination of the ‘moral and humanitarian principles’ on which the 
respective treaty is based or the presumed goal of broadening Statal participation in the particular 
category of treaties.  
Note the rather conspicuous parallels between the implicit operative premises of the 
compatibility test approach and the Baudrillardian logic of simulation. When the practice of 
signification shifts from the logic of representation to that of simulation, the truth of the sign is 
no longer determined by its correspondence to any external phenomena but is decided solely 
within the plane of signification itself. When the establishment of admissibility shifts from the 
opposability approach (Pan-American model) to the permissibility approach (compatibility test), 
the question of a reservation’s validity is no longer determined by the acts of diplomatic practice, 
but is decided instead solely within the conceptual horizon of the given treaty arrangement itself.  
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Note also the even more conspicuous parallels that connect the compatibility test 
approach at this point with the late-objectivist version of the will theory of contract. As 
mentioned earlier, if one had to isolate one central defining feature of late objectivism it was 
certainly the transition from the empiricist concept of contract to an essentially theoreticist one. 
Where previously the question of ‘what made a contract’ had been experienced and 
conceptualised primarily as a question of fact, with Corbin and Williston the general trend 
becomes to think of it strictly as a question of law. And if that were not enough, what counts as 
‘law’ in this context is quite obviously made a function of public policy considerations (welfare, 
justice, right and wrong), rather than anything which the contracting parties themselves might 
have any direct say over.  
The legalist turn, the inward-looking solipsism, the obvious readiness to equate law with 
public policy rather than private choices – the onset of the modernist sensibility behind the 
compatibility test model seems to be as unmistakable as it is striking.  
But note now also what sort of ontological implications follow from the adoption of the 
permissibility view. Whether or not a given reservation should be allowed to stand, under the 
permissibility theory is understood to be a question which one has to answer not by consulting 
what the other contracting parties think about this matter in the here and now, but by carefully 
analysing some nebulous latent core that is assumed to lie at the heart of the treaty. What is 
more, at no point is it admitted that this latent core must have necessarily left some kind of 
immediately identifiable traces on the actual surface of the treaty. And yet it is still understood to 
have a real enough existence to be treated not only as an object deserving of study and 
verification but also as an object deserving of a much greater degree of protection than the rest of 
the treaty put together.  
The closer one looks at this reasoning pattern, the more difficult it becomes not to notice 
that, essentially, the ontological foundations of the compatibility test approach mirror the 
metaphysical premises of the subjectivist version of the will theory of contract. Just like with 
subjectivism, under the compatibility test model the Court explicitly presumes the presence of a 
radical ontological split between the ‘external’ reality of the treaty and the ‘internal’ reality of 
the object and purpose package which, in the final analysis, has to be protected at all costs. Just 
like with subjectivism, it also takes for granted the idea ‘that the will of the parties, as expressed 
in the treaty, remains constant’,182 for, indeed, how could otherwise one ever conceptualise the 
treaty’s ‘object and purpose’ in an objective enough form for it to become usable as the practical 
yardstick for evaluating the validity of reservations many of which could well be submitted years 
after the adoption of the treaty’s original text?  
The argument could be extended further, but it should already be obvious where it is 
leading. The implicit theoretical structure underpinning its operative logic places the 
compatibility test model both much further away and much closer to the subjectivist theory of 
contract than either the Pan-American approach or the unanimity model. In terms of the 
evolutionary trajectory of the will theory of contract, this could be read then as some form of a 
schizophrenic split or a dialectical implosion. In a sense, of course, one can think of this as the 
result of compatibility test’s inheriting of unanimity theory’s subjectivist ontological structure: 
along with the latter’s preoccupation with protecting the bargain came the same contradiction-
creating dynamics which triggered the Great Structural Rift. But the reality is that the vector of 
the structural contradiction running through the theoretical grid of the compatibility test model 
lies in a completely different dimension.  
Besides, where the unanimity theory despite retaining a subjectivist onto-theoretical 
foundation favoured in practice the untailored default approach, the compatibility test model 
essentially turns away from the Procrustean style of the untailored solution. Admittedly, the way 
                                                 
182
 Bowett, supra n.44, 84. 
in which this is done does not automatically bring back the tailored default approach in its pure 
form: the default rule under the compatibility model is still couched in terms of a standard, off-
the-rack solution. But the substance of that solution, if one looks at it closely, requires that the 
legal decision-maker should always decide by investigating the ‘original’ content of the 
individual treaty in question, deducing the answers by divining how at the point of the 
conclusion of the bargain the object and purpose of the treaty had been defined. The chimera of 
the tailored default does not raise its head in full view, but one only needs to turn the corner to 
see it.  
An epistemological leap into the proto-modernist sensibility of legalist self-referentiality 
offset by an onto-theoretical involution to a kind of metaphysical obscurantism that even the 
unanimity theory in its highest form never came close to – it would be difficult to find a more 
powerful brew to stimulate a sense of unrelievable doctrinal anxiety. It would be equally 
difficult, however, to find a better recipe for the structural implosion of administrability.  
 
 
c. The Second Antinomy of the Compatibility Test Approach 
 
 
However much the unanimity theory may have failed in its operative design, the one thing it 
clearly had going for it was its exceptionally high degree of administrability,
183
 that is to say, it 
lent itself very easily to straightforward ‘mechanic’ application, both its initial hypothesis and its 
dispositive element being clearly demarcated and unambiguous.
184
  
Not so with the compatibility test approach.  Nothing in the Reservations opinion itself or 
in the text of the Vienna Convention gives the legal decision-maker any meaningful clue as to 
how one should determine the ‘object and purpose’ of a multilateral treaty. Whatever indications 
can be found in the Court’s reasoning are all so inconclusive as to be of no practical use. At first, 
the Court seems to suggest that contents of the Genocide Convention’s object and purpose can be 
deduced from the alleged motives and intentions of the General Assembly and the original 
contracting parties.
185
 Several lines later it goes on to point out that the Convention also has 
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‘manifest’ purposes that are listed in its preamble.186 In the paragraph immediately after that it 
moves to suggest that the determination can also be driven in large measure by the Convention’s 
non-synallagmatic nature,
187
 which inevitably implies either some kind of analytical-
jurisprudential analysis or some form of teleological reasoning. In short, if one looks at the entire 
argument sequence as a whole, what the Court essentially seems to be doing is casting the 
question of object and purpose determination as though it were a standard question of treaty 
interpretation, and there are, of course, very few areas in international law which can be as 
hopelessly contradictory in terms of their dispositive element as the law of treaty 
interpretation.
188
 Add to this the fact that the Court obviously chooses to draw on all three main 
schools of treaty interpretation (‘intentions of the parties’, ‘textualist’, and ‘teleological’), 189 and 
the situation does not become any easier.  
The story gets even bleaker when one turns to the institutional-procedural aspect of the 
compatibility test. The very nature of the test’s complexity, its open-endedness, and vagueness 
seem to make it unavoidable that in order to achieve any kind of interpretative certainty the 
question of admissibility has to be resolved in an organized centralized manner, preferably 
through some form of judicial decision-making process. No such provision, however, is 
envisaged at any point in the Reservations opinion. Nor has it been created since under 
customary international law. What is more, the drafters of the Vienna Convention quite 
unambiguously seem to have decided to refrain from introducing it.
190
  
In the absence of a centralized appraisal and validation procedure, the application of the 
test by default should fall to the contracting parties themselves. An immediate consequence of 
that, however, would be the radical expansion in the scope of interpretative divergence and, thus, 
even greater confusion. When every contracting party acquires the authority to voice its own 
opinion at to what exactly the object and purpose of the given multilateral treaty require in each 
given case, to say that this opens the room for subjective distortion and abuse of process is 
perhaps a mild understatement.
191
 A much more fitting conclusion would be that whatever 
differences may have existed between the compatibility model and the Pan-American approach 
at this point become effectively erased.
192
  
To complicate the matters even further, it seems the Court in the Reservations decision 
had been perfectly conscious of this possibility: ‘as no State can be bound by a reservation to 
which it has not consented’, it necessarily falls to each contracting party to assess the submitted 
reservation ‘on the basis of its individual appraisal’ of the treaty’s object and purpose. The 
‘disadvantages’ which can result from such a setup, of course, are undeniable: the ‘possible 
divergence of views’ between the parties is bound to be all the more considerable the greater the 
number of the parties. But, take heart, that is not at all recipe for interpretive chaos. What will 
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prevent this hugely unappetizing prospect from materializing then? The answer, as the Court 
presents, in effect is: large doses of positive thinking. ‘It must clearly be assumed that the 
contracting States are desirous of preserving intact at least what is essential to the object of the 
Convention’, for ‘should this desire be absent, it is quite clear that the Convention … would be 
impaired both in its principle and in its application.’193 A more elegant abdication of advisory 
responsibility could hardly be imagined. 
Put the two sides of the story together and what emerges in the end is a picture of an 
international legal regime whose institutional-procedural structure seems to have been designed 
in such a peculiar way that it could never facilitate the practical application of that very 
normative standard in the name of which it was introduced.  
At which point the question arises: so what exactly was this regime actually fit to 
facilitate then?  
 
d. The Third Antinomy of the Compatibility Test Approach 
 
Having proceeded up to this point in a predominantly analytical-jurisprudential register, let us 
shift the inquiry now towards the investigation of a somewhat different theoretical problematic. 
In the intellectual tradition which has made the exploration of this problematic its principal 
calling card the exercise that will be pursued over the next few pages would be called something 
like a positive investigation of the structural design of a legal regime from the point of view of 
economic theory, by which would be understood a descriptive-diagnostic examination of the way 
in which the internal juridical structure of the given legal regime tends to affect the conduct of its 
principal target audience and the society at large in terms of structuring their opportunity sets. 
The underlying idea is that legal rules tend to affect people’s behaviour by changing their 
individual incentive structures
194
 and thus affecting the make-up of their opportunity sets.
195
 One 
can think of this, as many economists do, in terms of the pricing metaphor in the sense that legal 
rules put prices on different types of conduct.
196
 Or one can use the slightly more archaic idiom 
of ‘social engineering’.197 The ultimate argument in both cases is the same: how a legal regime is 
arranged – what sort of substantive and procedural duties and entitlements it includes, what type 
of institutional mechanisms it relies on for its enforcement, etc. – tends to have a strong causal 
impact on how the respective category of legal subjects perceive they ought to behave in 
different situations (what incentives they receive); when the totality of these perceptions is 
correlated with the totality of what courses of action are otherwise objectively available to them, 
the resulting set of potential scenarios which the given subjects may consider joining (his set of 
opportunities) becomes possible to rank in, say, descending order from the more realistic to the 
less realistic;
198
 given that legal regimes do not exist for their own sake, this fact is certainly 
something to bear in mind whenever one sets out to assess and appraise them.
199
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edn.; 1987): ‘Rights define potential opportunities. An opportunity set is defined as the available lines of action open 
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Against this starting background, imagine now an open multilateral treaty with, say, 
twenty five existing parties. Suppose it has already entered into force and a twenty-sixth State 
now expresses an intention to accede to it, albeit subject to the possibility of attaching a minor 
reservation. How will the legal design of the compatibility test approach affect its opportunity set 
in this endeavour and how will the dynamics of its interaction with its potential treaty partners 
most likely unfold?  
By way of comparison, consider first how this situation would play out under the 
unanimity theory. Since all reservations under the unanimity model have to be first accepted by 
the existing parties, the most obvious course of conduct for the existing parties would be to 
engage in some form of rent-seeking behaviour, or, to put it more crudely, to try to extort the 
twenty-sixth State by demanding some kind of additional concessions in return for granting their 
permissions. Depending on how badly the twenty-sixth State wants to join the treaty, the next 
stage would then typically consist of either some kind of massive capitulation on its part, an 
irresolvable stalemate, or a complete termination of its accession process. Better still, because an 
informed player would easily be able to recognise the high likelihood of this scenario, there is a 
good chance that neither the first stage nor the second stage will happen at all: a large proportion 
of such ‘twenty-sixth States’, put off by the prospects of impending extortions, will feel 
discouraged to initiate their accession proceedings in the first place. Conclusion: a legal regime 
that systemically induces a chilling effect resulting in a completely unnecessary decrease in 
treaty participation.  
How exactly does this argument work? Suppose that by a certain point in its accession 
proceedings the twenty-sixth State has managed to secure consent for its proposed reservation 
from twenty four of the twenty five original parties. As it arrives at the ‘doorstep’ of the twenty-
fifth State, what sort of behavioural dynamics is most likely going to unfold between them? 
From the point of view of what would be ‘objectively’ desirable, it seems that the twenty-fifth 
State, inasmuch as it is meant at this point to act as an institutional organ representing the 
interests of the treaty’s participant community, should feel strongly inclined to accept the 
proposed reservation. After all, every one of its twenty four treaty partners has already consented 
to it. The achievement of such a degree of agreement is not something to be taken lightly. To 
reject the twenty-sixth State’s reservation at this stage would mean not only going against the 
expressed wishes of every one of the other twenty four States, it would also mean disregarding 
the communal opinion and, thus, undermining the very objective of a multilateral process.  
And yet, inasmuch as the general premise of modern international relations holds true, 
the most likely scenario that is going to take place under these circumstances is that the twenty-
fifth State will enthusiastically refuse the proposed reservation and thus block the twenty-sixth 
State’s accession. Why?  
In most strands of modern-day international relations scholarship, it is typically assumed 
that almost all States almost all of the time tend to act in pursuit of their national interests. 
Naturally, this does not make it impossible, as various contributors from the institutionalist and 
constructivist schools have demonstrated time and time again, that in some specific cases some 
States may come to form their foreign policy decisions under the influence of other decisional 
factors. But in the vast majority of situations it still seems to remain true that, on the whole, 
States do act in a fundamentally self-interested way, even if the basic concept of self-
interestedness in this context may generally be broader than what one would normally 
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understand by it in classical economics.
200
 Seen against this backdrop, the fact that every one of 
its treaty partners has already granted their assent to the proposed reservation puts the twenty-
fifth State in the position of a unilateral veto-holder. All that remains for the twenty-sixth State 
before it can join the given treaty is to collect one last ‘yes’. The ownership of this ‘yes’ at the 
moment, however, belongs to the twenty-fifth State. Considering how much the acquisition of 
this ‘yes’ matters now to the twenty-sixth State, why should the twenty-fifth State not exploit the 
opportunity and ‘raise the price’ by, say, requesting from the twenty-sixth State the dispensing of 
some special favour – privileges or concessions that it otherwise would not have been able to 
obtain or would have had to obtain at a much more considerable cost?  
In classical economic theory, the term that is used to describe the twenty-fifth State’s 
behaviour is holdout.
201
 As classically defined, a holdout represents a mixture of blackmail and 
rent-seeking activity. From the point of view of the objective social interest (the interests of the 
treaty’s participant community as a whole), the possibility of the twenty-fifth State’s ‘holding 
out’ against the twenty-sixth State’s accession unquestionably constitutes a structural design 
problem. The hypothetical offered presumes that the reservation proposed by the twenty-sixth 
State would be minor and of no direct consequence to the positions of the existing parties. 
However, even if the twenty-fifth State stood something to lose from the twenty-sixth State’s 
reservation, from the communitarian perspective the benefit of adding a twenty-sixth treaty 
partner would still very likely outweigh any costs that would be incurred by the twenty-fifth 
State. Because, however, the twenty-fifth State holds an absolute property right over its ‘yes’, 
and because it is much more likely than not going to formulate its decision on the basis of its 
direct national interest, that scenario is not actually going to happen.  
Note two important points. First, the only reason why the twenty-fifth State can resort to 
this kind of political blackmail is because the legal structure imposed under the unanimity theory 
would allow it to do so. It is the way in which the legal regime advocated by the unanimity 
approach distributes legal entitlements, duties, and powers among the participant players that 
enables the ‘last party’ to demand extortionate rent payments in return for its consent to the 
proposed reservation. Second, given that the twenty-fifth State is going to be able to recognise 
this fact, there is a good chance that that so also would the first twenty four States. If the law puts 
the twenty-fifth State into such an attractive position, why not try to ‘become’ the twenty-fifth 
State? All it takes to ‘get there’ is some procrastination with making up one’s mind, so that the 
twenty-four other States can speak their mind first. Or, indeed, if you think about, why wait until 
the twenty-fifth ‘stage’ at all? If the twenty-fifth State can blackmail the new arrival, why could 
not the twenty-fourth State do the same? Or the twenty-third State? In fact, given how this logic 
plays out, why not start extorting the twenty-sixth State from the very beginning?  
Taken to its logical conclusion, every legal regime allowing for a holdout eventually 
results either in a deeply undesirable redistribution of political resources (typically from the 
victims to the blackmailers, but not necessarily: the twenty-fifth State can extort any one of the 
other twenty four States too, if it sees that it has developed a particularly acute interest in the 
twenty-sixth State’s accession) or in an irresolvable behavioural stalemate leading to a complete 
breakdown of social cooperation. What is more, because the prospect of a potential holding out 
reduces the expected rate of return for the potential victim, it becomes highly possible that the 
moment the victim recognises the structure of the respective legal regime for what it is, it will 
pre-emptively abandon at least some part of its initiative, which also would negatively affect the 
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prospects of social cooperation inasmuch as it would lead to a certain degree of under-
participation on the part of all self-perceived potential victims.  
Both the Pan-American approach and the compatibility test model allow the treaty 
community to counteract the holdout problem on the part of the twenty-fifth State. The way in 
which this is achieved in the former case is by transferring the absolute property right from the 
objecting State to the reserving State; in the latter case – that is to say, under the permissibility 
theory version of the compatibility model – by doing essentially the same but adding also a 
further duty applicable to the reserving State to observe the integrity of the treaty’s object and 
purpose and offsetting this duty with a remedial right on the part of the objecting State to prevent 
the treaty’s entry into force between itself and the reserving State.202    
So far, so good, but every solution sooner or later creates its own set of problems. 
Already as far back as 1953 Gerald Fitzmaurice noted the problems the application of the Pan-
American approach creates in the case of the so-called ‘normative’ multilateral treaties. When it 
came to those ‘Conventions the essence and operation of which involve the grant by each of the 
parties to each of the others of a number of reciprocal rights, benefits or privileges’, the Pan-
American model doubtless proved itself rather ‘capable’. But then there were also those treaties, 
such as the Genocide Convention, where the regime of obligations imposed was ‘both general 
and absolute’ and thus ‘neither depending on the participation of other countries by virtue of 
operating in relation to them, nor, as to the scope of its application by any one party [,] limited 
merely to the nationals or interests of such other countries as are also parties.’ 203 And there the 
utility of the Pan-American model was significantly more problematic. 
 
It is this peculiarity of ‘normative’ Conventions, namely that they operate in, so to 
speak, the absolute, and not relatively to the other parties – i.e. they operate for each 
party per se, and not between the parties inter se – coupled with the further peculiarity 
that they involve mainly the assumption of duties and obligations, and do not confer 
direct rights or benefits on the parties qua States, that gives these Conventions their 
special juridical character, and makes the application to them of the Pan-American 
system of reservations inappropriate, and indeed undesirable.
204
   
 
The Court in its discussion of the special character of the Genocide Convention, of course, fully 
recognised the existence of this peculiar category of multilateral treaties. But its response to its 
special features, implies Fitzmaurice, clearly suggested the presence of a fundamental analytical 
failure. In institutional-procedural terms, the compatibility test model as envisaged by the Court 
was indistinguishable from the Pan-American approach. ‘It can readily be seen’, however, notes 
Fitzmaurice, 
 
that … the application of the [Pan-American] system to the normative type of 
Convention must involve that all or nearly all the advantage is with the reserving 
State, while all the disadvantages accrue to the objecting State, whose objections are 
for all practical purposes rendered ineffective. The objecting State, despites its 
objection, is still itself obliged to apply the Convention in full, and is not relieved from 
any part of its obligation; while to say that it is relieved from having to apply it 
‘towards’ the reserving State, or ‘as between’ it and that State, means nothing, for the 
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obligations of the Convention are not of that kind. The reserving State, on the other 
hand, only has to carry out the Convention subject to reservations which may relieve it 
from some important part of the burden. There is thus created a situation of pure 
privilege for the reserving State, which it can establish for itself at will, and in which 
the normal sanction or deterrent against the use of reservations, namely the 
withholding of the corresponding advantages, breaks down, because there are no 
advantages to withhold.
205
  
 
Now, from the internal point of view of the Pan-American approach, none of this, strictly 
speaking, constitutes a problem. The possibility of an unstoppable evisceration of the ‘treaty 
commitment’ cannot in any way be considered a threat if treaties by definition are conceived as 
enabling contexts and non-substantive frameworks. But if one shifts the focal point of analysis 
and reconsiders the situation in terms of the practical effect this setup creates in the context of 
normative conventions themselves, the problem Fitzmaurice identifies certainly seems very real. 
In the language of modern law-and-economics, it would be described normally in terms of 
enforcement deficit problem, but since there would actually be no enforcement issues involved 
from the point of view of the Pan-American approach itself, a more fitting characterisation 
would probably have to be formulated in the language of negative externalities suffered by the 
non-reserving parties at the behest of the reserving party.  
As traditionally defined, negative externalities arise wherever a given subject’s actions 
result in the imposition of costs on others which the subject then does not in any way pay for. 
The reserving State’s opportunity under the Pan-American approach to become a party to a treaty 
while relieving itself of a substantial part of its burden offers a typical illustration. If the 
reserving State takes advantage of this opportunity, it would leave the other parties to the treaty 
(which will still be obliged to carry out the treaty’s obligations in full) relatively worse off in the 
same way in which the non-payment of taxes by a ‘tax exile’ who is physically resident in the 
jurisdiction leaves other citizens who do pay their taxes worse off. Like the reserving State, they 
too will still be able to enjoy the same benefits (e.g. the symbolic boost to national reputation 
attendant on being recognised as a party to a convention promoting a progressive or noble 
cause).
206
 Unlike the reserving State, they will go on to pay a considerably heavier price for the 
possibility of enjoying this benefit. At the micro-level, one could say, the reserving State will 
thus undercut the non-reserving States. At the macro-level, because the reserving State is not 
going to be the only bright kid on the block, the inherent dynamics of the situation can be 
expected to pressure every non-reserving State to adopt the same pattern of behaviour too. What 
this will lead to should not be difficult to predict. A race to the bottom resulting in a field-
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specific version of the tragedy of commons: a gradual hollowing-out of the treaty’s legal regime 
that (absent conspiracy theory) in the long run serves none of the parties that drafted it any good, 
but is nevertheless inexorably achieved as every contracting party, having first agreed at the time 
of negotiations to adopt a robustly phrased text, at the time of ratification slips in an accession 
instrument saddled with any number of far-reaching reservations that greatly reduce the 
robustness of the treaty’s legal effect. Since none of the other parties will stand anything to gain 
from objecting to such reservations, and considering how expensive in political terms the 
business of upsetting one’s treaty partners by challenging their corner-cutting initiatives that do 
not actually harm one’s own interests may turn out to be, each of the reserving States can be 
assured of a ‘free passage’ on this front, and yet from the systemic point of view what good 
would creating this sort of regime serve?
207
  
To give it its due, though, the operative design of the Pan-American approach never did 
indicate any promise to protect the integrity of some substantive core at the heart of the treaty, a 
fact which, however, cannot also be claimed on behalf of the compatibility test approach. 
Does the regime established under the compatibility test model suffer from an 
enforcement deficit dynamics? Undeniably. The analogy with the tax exile in the earlier example 
and the reference to the tragedy of the commons potentiality suggest a crucial insight into the 
operative logic of this dynamics. Both in the ordinary usage and in the economic vernacular, a 
tax exile who, while physically residing in a jurisdiction, does not contribute to the tax revenues 
would normally be described as a free rider. The incorporation into the compatibility test model 
of the Pan-American approach’s decentralised institutional setup replicates in its formal structure 
the same opportunity set-formative dynamics as one would witness under the typical free rider 
scenario.  
Writes Vilfredo Pareto: 
 
If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the 
community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one 
continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the 
one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he 
incurs as a member of the community.
208
 
 
To put the matter in a slightly more formal way, the enabling conditions for the emergence of the 
free-rider dynamics include, firstly, the structural unavoidability of positive externalities; 
secondly, non-exclusivity of the enjoyment of benefits; and, thirdly, propensity for rational 
behaviour. When the non-refraining individual in Pareto’s example proceeds to withhold his 
participation in communal action, he can still enjoy the benefits created by it. Because he will not 
anymore have to contribute towards the costs of maintaining that action, however, he will also be 
able now to make an additional saving equal to the size of those costs. Presuming the presence of 
both the intention and the capacity for rational behaviour, the moment this realisation hits home 
the most likely next step for him would be to do exactly that.   
Note the logical structure behind this scenario. For the free rider problem to come into 
existence, the communal action in question has to result in the creation of benefits that can be 
enjoyed as easily by the non-contributors as by the contributors. The ‘good’ created as the result 
of the communal action, in other words, must be inherently non-excludable. In the economic 
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vernacular, this type of ‘goods’ are usually described as ‘public goods’ or ‘collective goods’. A 
classic example offered in the literature is the operation of a lighthouse: every shipmaster 
benefits from the light emitted by the lighthouse, regardless of whether or not they paid anything 
towards its construction and maintenance. Another oft-cited example would be the cleaning of 
communal areas or the restoration of public order by means of a citizen’s arrest.  
The positive externalities aspect in all of these situations comes out in the fact that once 
the public good is delivered, there will exist no way for the contributors to charge the non-
contributors their share of the costs. If the contributors could force the non-contributors to cough 
up their share, the latter’s ride would not be free anymore. The same holds true if the enjoyment 
of the ‘good’ can be kept exclusive to the contributors. Thus, subject to the assumption of 
rational behaviour, the two principal preconditions for the formation of a free-rider dynamics are 
the opening of the scope for positive externalities and the non-exclusivity of benefit enjoyment. 
(A third precondition that is commonly identified in the literature – the absence of an effective 
mechanism of coercion that could be used against the non-contributors – follows on from the 
logical combination of the first two.)  
As soon as both of these conditions are brought together, unless there exists some reason 
to assume a propensity for irrational behaviour, what is going to follow inevitably will be a 
poisonous mix of (i) a system-wide culture of compulsive ‘cheating’; (ii) radical under-
production and under-delivery of public goods; and (iii) an unavoidable sense of paranoia in the 
face of every instance where the public goods in question have actually been produced and 
delivered at the ‘appropriate’ level.  
How does this reasoning work? In its most basic form, the causal dynamics behind the 
free-rider scenario was first documented by Mancur Olson. The reasoning chain began with the 
following observation:  
 
In any group in which participation is voluntary, the member or members whose 
shares of the marginal cost exceed their shares of the additional benefits will stop 
contributing to the achievement of the collective good before the group optimum has 
been reached.
209
   
 
Absent any mechanism of behavioural coercion, every member of any given collective project, 
inasmuch as his behaviour is driven by rational thinking, will tend to restrict the size of his 
contributions to the project’s upkeep in the light of his evaluation of his individual trade-offs, 
rather than in the light of the actual ‘objective’ needs of the project. So long as the project in 
question results in the production of a good which remains enjoyable only by the project’s 
participants, there will obtain, consequently, a pattern of relative under-investment. As soon, 
however, as the enjoyment of the good becomes non-exclusive, the risk immediately arises that 
at some point the level of investment will plummet to zero. The production of the good will 
cease and, amidst a ‘universal’ culture of free-riding, a systemic breakdown in the economy of 
that good will eventually ensue.  
The larger the scale of the voluntary collective project, the larger, in other words, the size 
of the group, the more likely, observes Olson, that this sort of scenario is going to occur. In 
smaller groups, because of the corrective effect created by the dynamics of spontaneous mutual 
monitoring typically arising in such contexts, the dominant tendency will, thus, be towards a 
merely ‘suboptimal provision of collective goods’; in larger groups, because the greater number 
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of players involved increases the scope of free-riding going unnoticed, the dominant tendency 
will lean closer and closer towards a total non-provision tout court.
210
  
And yet even in the larger-scale groups the combination of positive externalities and non-
exclusivity of benefit enjoyment does not necessarily guarantee a complete cessation in the 
provision of public goods. The reason for this comes from the fact that under certain conditions 
the dynamics of voluntary interaction within the group may result in the emergence of what 
could be called the rational over-spender.  
Where the members of the group are not necessary equal to one another in terms of their 
stature, degree of interest in the public good, or investment capacity, remarks Olson, it is not at 
all inconceivable that a ‘single member’ may emerge who will be able to secure ‘such a 
significant proportion of the total benefit from the collective good that he will gain from seeing 
that the good is provided, even if he has to pay all of the cost himself.’211 One can think of the 
example of a shipping company that sends so many of its ships through a particular stretch of 
water that it becomes rational for it to invest in the construction of a lighthouse even if it will not 
be able to charge any other shipping company their share of the costs, or a neighbour whose 
particularly high level of personal intolerance for dirty communal areas causes him to clean those 
areas voluntarily. In both situations the decision to invest in the provision of the public goods 
will seem to the ‘single member’ in question perfectly rational.  
But note two important caveats. Firstly, because their assessment of what is rational will 
be determined by their individual trade-offs, the level of the public good provision is still going 
to remain at the systemically suboptimal level. The shipping company will build a lighthouse 
only over that stretch of water through which it sends its ships. The grime-intolerant neighbour 
will clean only those parts of the communal areas which he tends to visit himself. The rational 
over-spender will over-spend, but only to the extent to which it still makes sense in terms of his 
private cost-benefit function. Anything above and beyond that would be philanthropy and 
compulsive charity. Neither the one nor the other, of course, is in itself a categorical 
impossibility, but in the context in which it is recognised as an obvious empirical fact that none 
of the players involved is a philanthropist or a charitable organisation, the first and the most 
pressing question that will arise as soon as one witnesses a pattern of private provision of public 
goods that does not seem to make obvious rational sense is: what sort of additional motives may 
have been overlooked? Why did this high-spending ‘single member’ develop such a keen interest 
in the provision of the public good beyond what would be evidently rational for him? Could 
there be some other, as yet unrecognised benefits that he is expecting to draw in this case? Could 
these benefits be in any way unsavoury or objectionable? The second caveat that has to be added 
to the theory of the rational over-spender, in other words, is that no matter how attractive the idea 
of the private provision of public goods may seem, it will always bring with itself a powerful 
sense of paranoia.  
The world of inter-statal relations is not known for its regular demonstrations of 
philanthropy or charitable action. States do not typically act in the interests of the ‘world 
community’ unless they are moved by some kind of ulterior motives. How should one then 
interpret against this background a situation where one of the parties to a ‘normative convention’ 
decides to enforce the compatibility test against a reserving State, given that the operative logic 
of such type of convention, by definition, can confer no direct benefit on any of its parties qua 
States? 
The behavioural dynamics induced by the decentralized institutional setup envisaged 
under the Pan-American approach and inherited by the Vienna regime, as should already be 
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clear, is indistinguishable from the behavioural dynamics of voluntary collective projects 
described by Pareto and Olson. So long as the treaty in question follows some kind of 
synallagmatic logic, the objecting State will see no reason to withdraw its participation in the 
enforcement of the compatibility test. There will be no temptation to simply sit back and do 
nothing. The quantity of total enforcement, in other words, will thus tend to remain adequate and 
generally balanced.  
But in the case of non-synallagmatic treaty regimes, the incentive structures are going to 
look completely different. Where the non-synallagmaticity of the regime consists in the fact that 
it creates a web of what has been termed integral legal obligations, that is to say, obligations the 
faithful performance of which by every treaty participant constitutes an indispensable 
precondition for the rational compliance by every other participant (a typical example here 
would be a disarmament treaty), the non-reserving States will still, obviously, retain a very 
healthy level of enforcement incentives.
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 However, not all non-synallagmatic regimes give rise 
to integral legal obligations. What Fitzmaurice calls ‘normative conventions’ in general, and 
multilateral human rights treaties in particular, offer a glaring example of non-integral non-
synallagmatic treaty regimes. How does the decentralized institutional procedure of the Pan-
American approach affect the operation of the compatibility test in their case? Unavoidably, it 
creates the conditions for the emergence of the free-rider dynamics.  
Given the structural setup of the enforcement procedure, any enforcement action will 
entail considerable private costs for the enforcing State that it will not be able to pass on to the 
other non-reserving States. Whatever good might be produced by the enforcement action will all 
be non-exclusive in the same way in which cleaning the communal areas or the restoration of the 
public order is. Unlike in the clean-up scenario, ‘saving’ the human rights cause from the 
nefarious designs of the illiberal reserver will entail costs going far beyond the immediate costs 
of the action itself. First, like in the citizen’s arrest scenario, the enforcing State will acquire the 
somewhat dubious reputation of a self-appointed vigilante.  Second, it will much more likely 
than not also attract the immediate ire of the reserving State, which, unlike in the citizen’s arrest 
scenario, stands no chance of getting locked up or being prevented from resorting to retaliation 
by the subsequent intervention of the police force. Add to this the fact that States, by definition, 
cannot be among the immediate beneficiaries of the human rights cause, and it becomes 
painfully obvious that under such circumstances no non-reserving State will find it rational to 
object to any reservations made by its treaty partners.  
In the case of the smaller-scale treaties, over time this pattern is going to lead to a 
systemic deterioration of the regime’s integrity, that is to say, many reservations that are 
incompatible with the treaty’s immediate ‘object and purpose’ will be admitted and allowed to 
stand. In the case of the larger-scale treaties – and admittedly it is not entirely clear where the 
‘smaller-scale’ ends and the ‘larger-scale’ begins, but the point, nonetheless, still seems to hold – 
the inevitable risk will become that at some point there is going to be practically no enforcement 
of the compatibility test at all.  
What is more, whenever any enforcement action will take place, the immediate suspicion 
will be that the enforcing State is not probably acting out of ‘honest intentions’. Could it be that 
it is seeking some form of self-aggrandizement by positing itself as the world’s policeman? Or is 
it just trying to get at the reserving State for something the latter had done in the past? Could it 
be that the enforcing State is using the law of reservations to intervene in the internal affairs of 
the reserved State or to settle some political scores that have nothing to do with the particular 
treaty in question? If that is so, what are the chances it has deliberately misinterpreted the 
compatibility test? And let us not forget also the fact that some types of ‘normative conventions’ 
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tend to be highly ideologically charged, which opens the space for all kinds of hegemonic 
temptations especially when set against the background of a relationship between a former 
colony and its colonial master. Could the compatibility test become a site for a ‘civilising 
mission’?  
A report prepared in 2004 for the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights observed that the overwhelming majority of objections made with regard to 
reservations submitted under human rights treaties tend to come from States traditionally listed 
as part of ‘Western European and Others Group’. Outside of that group, the only regular 
objectors appear to be Saudi Arabia and Mexico.
213
 Doubtless one should build a whole castle of 
suspicions on one fact. The same report notes also that most of the objections made by the 
members of the Western Group were made against the reservations that also came from the 
members of the Western Group.
214
 But the implicit geopolitics of such patterns is certainly not 
insignificant.  
Like the holdout problem, the free-rider problem is essentially the product of a flawed 
institutional design, or, in other words, an ill thought-out arrangement of the background legal 
regime. Between the two, however, it is undeniably the latter that results in a much more 
pernicious social dynamics, since, on the whole, everyone can become a free rider. It does not 
take that much skill or strategic acumen. The holdout, to be successful, must demonstrate ‘a high 
degree of negotiating, bargaining, and bluffing skills’. All that the free rider has to do is simply 
sit back and wait.
215
 
Does this mean that the switch from the unanimity model to the Pan-American approach 
effected by the Court in the Reservations decision represented in some intangible political sense 
a step back? The answer depends on one’s starting ideological assumptions. One of the principal 
challenges confronting every lawmaker, from the law-and-economics point of view, is which of 
these two species of collective action to give more attention to. ‘The essential dilemma’, as 
Richard Epstein points out, ‘is that often the effort to counteract one problem will only aggravate 
the other, for where both are present, they stand in an inverse relationship with each other.’216 To 
preference the need to counteract the free rider dynamics in the law of reservations is to discount 
the threat of the holdout: a view one would typically associate with the utopian communitarian 
position. To accept the risk of the free rider as an acceptable price to pay for the escape from the 
holdout is to show a fundamental distrust towards the international community’s capacity to be 
either effective or benevolent: a view one would typically associate with sovereigntism or 
international legal nationalism. The International Court of Justice in the Reservations opinion, 
the drafters of the Vienna Convention, and the International Law Commission in its berating of 
the Human Rights Committee’s assessment of the Vienna regime’s institutional and procedural 
shortcomings in General Comment No. 24 all unequivocally threw their weight behind the latter 
option, thus nailing their Démoguean (sovereigntist, pro-will theory, pro-freedom of contract) 
colours to the mast. And yet, was there really any other alternative? 
 
 
                                                 
213
 Hampson, supra n.49, §30. 
214
 Id., §31. 
215
 Cohen, supra n.201, 359.  
216
 Epstein, supra n.201, 557. 
SECTION 5. THE DOCTRINAL MEANING OF GENERAL COMMENT NO. 24 
 
 
a. The Traditional View 
 
 
What was the basic intertextuality of the doctrinal field at the time of the adoption of General 
Comment No. 24? What was the basic makeup, in other words, of that historically constituted 
archive of ideas, doctrines, assumptions, and thinking habits against the background of which the 
Human Rights Committee presented its reform initiative for the Covenant? There exist several 
different ways to describe the general structure of the legal-theoretical landscape in which the 
Committee found itself as it tried to navigate its way towards whatever it was it chose as its 
ultimate goal.  
In the traditional understanding (see Section 2), this structure would be typically 
presented first as having two radically different points of origin, the unanimity theory and the 
Pan-American approach, which arranged vis-à-vis one another in a pattern of quasi-Hegelian 
dialectical contradiction. The eventual outcome of this contradiction both chronologically and 
genealogically then would be found in the compatibility test model in reference to which – and it 
alone – the Committee’s initiative would have to be assessed. Before the assessment could start, 
however, another important dimension of the received wisdom would come into play. As 
typically projected, the quasi-Hegelian model in the received narrative would constantly contend 
for theoretical dominance with another similarly teleologist representation whose origins also, 
curiously enough, can be traced to a great 19
th
-century tradition. This second representation has a 
strong sense of Darwinian overcoding. Its influence on the formation of the traditional 
understanding of the history of the law of reservations comes out in the projection of the act of 
the initial emergence of both classical approaches as an expression of international law’s 
functional response (adaptation) to differently constructed politico-institutional environments; 
their subsequent conflict in the early post-World War II period as the metaphoric equivalent of 
the great evolutionary struggle; the eventual rise of the compatibility test approach as the explicit 
vindication of the quasi-Hobbesean thesis of natural selection (survival of the fittest).  
Seen against the background of such a thoroughly organicist
217
 emplotment
218
 pattern, the 
question of the doctrinal meaning of General Comment No. 24, quite unsurprisingly, invites 
itself to be thought and modelled, even if not necessarily also openly articulated, in terms of 
some kind of a quasi-evolutionary teleologist metaphor. Thus, either what the Committee sought 
to do in the No. 24 marked a remarkable evolutionary breakthrough, or it marked an unfortunate 
slip into an evolutionary side branch that led into a dead end. In the latter case, the Committee’s 
vision would then be implicitly compared to the proverbial Neanderthal man, the vehement 
response to it led by the Commission and the contracting parties representing the triumph of the 
much better environmentally adapted Homo Sapiens of the Vienna regime. In the former case, 
the Neanderthal man would have been the Committee’s critics, who in a tragically farcical 
reversal of the classical account of evolution managed to ambush and bludgeon to death the 
unsuspecting Homo Sapiens of the Comment which, if only history played out fairly, would have 
been certainly much better adapted to the environmental pressures of the human rights 
treatymaking process than the Vienna regime.  
One can continue this ‘archaeological’ reconstruction of the traditional view, but there 
seems to be little justification for that. The presentation of international lawmaking as an 
adaptive response to the needs of the time, the assumption of some kind of monistic 
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expressiveness-cum-functional fit between ‘theoretical visions’ and historical epochs, the 
encoding of the rise and fall of theoretical fashions as a form of natural selection, the projection 
of the same imagery of ineluctable transition from the retrograde culture of extreme naturalist 
restrictiveness to the enlightened culture of balancing tests and prudent pragmatism via the 
cynical intermission of extreme positivist permissiveness over and over – these are all very 
common tropes in mainstream international law scholarship, whose use is certainly not limited to 
the traditional discourse on the history of the law of reservations. Perhaps in some other contexts 
their deployment may still remain justified. In the present case, however, their combination 
seems to result, at best, in the ever-progressive disintegration of intellectual hygiene; at worst, in 
the complete arrest of every investigative and knowledge-productive process.  
 
 
b. The Doctrinal-Genealogical View 
 
 
To understand the specifically legal dimension of the essential identity of General Comment No. 
24 as a legal-historical event, it is necessary to grasp the structure of the general relationship 
between the Committee’s vision as an act of doctrinal imagination and the vision inscribed into 
the Vienna regime, but it is certainly not the only intertextually structured doctrinal-theoretical 
relationship that needs to be clarified and accounted for before any judgment, however tentative, 
could be properly offered. How does the Committee’s vision fit within the broader structure of 
the field? What does the structure of its relationship with the Vienna approach reveal about its 
place in the overall doctrinal landscape of the law of reservations?  
To make the exercise easier to follow, the subsequent discussion is organised in four 
parts, each part reflecting a distinct dimension of the intertextual doctrinal linkages connecting 
the Committee’s vision to the rest of the doctrinal archive. For the sake of convenience, each 
dimension is presented in the form of a diagram, the operative category for which is conceived in 
terms of the legal-theoretical categories elaborated in substantive terms in the earlier sections 
(see Sections 3 and 4).  
In the first instance, every part begins with a review of the two classical models and the 
compatibility test approach. Once the general structure of the field mapped out on this basis is 
clarified, the second round of mapping adds the structures of the linkages responsible for the 
doctrinal location (meaning) of General Comment No. 24.  
1. Administrability. One of the main weaknesses of the compatibility test approach, as 
observed earlier, is that it exhibits a very low degree of administrability. Both the unanimity 
theory and the Pan-American approach, by contrast, project highly administrable legal regimes. 
Schematically, the relationship among them can thus be represented in the following way:  
Low degree of administrability  High degree of administrability 
 
 Unanimity Theory (UT) 
 
Compatibility Test Approach (CTA) 
  
 Pan-American Approach   
 (PAA) 
 
The two main causes of the low administrability of the compatibility test were the introduction of 
an essentially unformalisable substantive element, stemming from an opaquely defined 
hypothesis (‘if the integrity of the object and purpose is not preserved …’), and the deployment 
of the decentralised institutional-procedural arrangement characteristic of the opposability 
theory, which made the administration of that substantive element in practice even more 
problematic (see Section 4c). The partial overturning of the Vienna regime proposed by the 
Committee entailed the introduction of a different institutional-procedural arrangement effected 
by the monopolisation of appraisal and validation functions by the Committee itself, but it still 
presumed an unqualified retention of the same substantive element (see Section 1c). The 
resulting transformation of the regime structure thus involved a relatively notable reduction of 
the administrability deficit achieved in part by the radical contraction of the scope for 
interpretive chaos, but in part also by the elimination of the structural contradiction between the 
substantive (permissibility) and the institutional (opposability) elements of the Vienna regime.  
Inasmuch as the opaquely defined hypothesis remained an integral part of the overall vision, 
however, the reduction remained only partial.  
Thus, the intertextual doctrinal linkages of the General Comment No. 24 vision in this 
dimension of analysis can be schematically represented as follows: 
 
 UT 
 
 CTA 
  
 PAA  
  
 
General Comment No. 24 (GC24) 
 
 
2. Tailored vs. Untailored Default Approach. As noted earlier, one of the crucial differences 
between the compatibility test approach and the two classical models lies in the fact that the 
former shows a partially suppressed propensity towards the adoption of the tailored default 
approach (see Section 4b). The propensity is suppressed because formally the approach still 
remains unmistakably ‘untailoredist’. However, the substance of the proposed default rehearses, 
in a nesting fashion,
219
 what could be understood as the traditional ‘tailoredist’ mentality.  
Schematically, if we present this relationship in terms of a continuum of contradictions 
and coherence, the picture would look as follows:  
 
 
Propensity towards the    Unequivocal endorsement of 
the tailored default solution   the untailored default approach 
 
 UT 
 
 CTA 
  
 PAA  
  
 
The retention by the Committee of the basic substantive element of the Vienna regime 
reproduced inevitably the same dynamics of suppressed ‘tailoredism’. Its declaration, however, 
of a long list of the types of reservations which it found to be automatically inadmissible under 
the Covenant (see Section 1c), coupled with its proposal in § 18 of the Comment to consider all 
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inadmissible reservations retroactively severable regardless of how the particular reserving States 
may have viewed the conditioning effect of these reservations on their acts of accession at the 
time of making them, can be taken as an indication of a strongly pronounced shift in the direction 
of a more consistently untailored default attitude.  
Thus, once again, the intertextual doctrinal position of the Committee’s vision appears 
schematically to follow the same structure:  
 
 UT 
 
 CTA 
  
 PAA 
 
 
           GC24 
 
 
3. Transcendence of Subjectivism. While the Pan-American approach appears to offer a fully 
coherent enactment of the objectivist sensibility (see Section 3l), both the compatibility test and 
the unanimity theory approaches are premised on a fundamentally contradictory relationship to 
subjectivism. In the former case the contradiction manifests itself in what has been described as 
the schizophrenic split between the epistemological and the ontological implications of the 
compatibility model itself (see Section 4b). In the case of the unanimity theory, the contradiction 
takes the form of the Great Structural Rift created by the disjuncture between the model’s 
operative practical setup and its official theory (self-justification) (see Section 3k).  
Schematically, the structure of this relationship can be represented thus: 
 
 
Structural contradiction    Coherence 
 
 UT 
  
 
PAA 
 
 
 CTA 
 
  
None of the changes proposed by the Committee in the Comment affected the substantive 
element of the Vienna regime. Hence, the structural relationship between the Committee’s vision 
and the rest of the doctrinal archive in this case appears to look as follows: 
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4. Typology of Rent-Seeking Exposure. Both the Pan-American approach and the compatibility 
test approach suffer from an exposure to the free-rider dynamics in the case of what Gerald 
Fitzmaurice called ‘normative conventions’ (see Section 4d). The unanimity theory model, by 
contrast, is vulnerable to the holdout dynamics (see Section 4d). The two types of dynamics, as 
noted earlier, are in many ways mutually exclusive. The holdout falls under the umbrella of 
negative externalities; the free rider emerges under the conditions of positive externalities.  
Structurally, the network of relationships connecting the three models in this dimension 
of their operability can thus be expressed in the following way: 
 
Holdout        Free Rider 
 
 PAA 
 
 
UT 
 
 CTA 
 
Like the holdout, the free rider is a product of institutional design flaw. The partial 
reorganisation of the Vienna regime proposed by the Committee was intended to address 
precisely this issue.  
In basic economic terms, the two keys to the emergence of the free-rider dynamics lie, on 
the one hand, in the non-exclusivity of the enjoyment of benefits and, on the other hand, in the 
endemic character of the conditions enabling the rise of positive externalities. Institutionally, 
both factors are tied to the decentralised character of the decision-making process establishing 
the level of collective investment, or, in other words, the absence of mechanism for cost-sharing 
enforcement. Seen in this light, the classical solution to the free-rider problem would be either to 
centralise the decision-making process, i.e. create a public authority that would be charged with 
the task of providing the respective collective good, or to introduce a system of ‘separate and 
selective’ incentives so that the enjoyment of the good in question becomes limited only to cost-
contributors.
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 Failing that, the dominant trend will remain towards, depending on the 
circumstances, a notably suboptimal provision of the good – in the present case, the upholding of 
the integrity of the normative convention’s object and purpose.   
Not all types of collective goods, however, support the use of the second option. One 
could imagine such a restructuring of collective bargaining rules as would allow the benefits of 
any deals struck by the trade unions to be shared only among the union membership. But 
‘classical’ public goods, such as ordre public or the light provided by the lighthouse, are non-
exclusive ‘by design’ and so are impossible to turn into ‘club goods’ under any circumstances.  
Viewed from this angle, the Committee’s proposal in General Comment No. 24 appears 
to embody the only possible effective solution to the institutional flaws of the Vienna regime in 
its application to the Covenant. By instituting a de facto centralised procedure for the appraisal 
and validation of reservations, the Committee both eliminated the scope for enforcement deficit 
dynamics created under Article 20 of the Vienna Convention and addressed the sort of abuse-of-
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right concerns one might typically have in the presence of an excessively eager enforcement 
practice (the rational over-spender scenario).  
Every institutional solution, however, tends to create its own abuse-of-right (rent-
seeking) opportunities. While it may certainly solve the problem of the free-rider in the case of 
human rights treaties, the Committee’s initiative quite certainly would also open the scope for a 
whole new set of heretofore absent problems. Some of these problems, admittedly, would take 
the form of only potential weaknesses. Others, however, would result in the creation of very real 
negative externalities.  
Consider, to begin with, the downsides of any monopoly arrangement. In classical 
economic terms, the negative externalities produced by any centralisation of market supply 
include at the very least foregone consumer surplus (monopolies have no cause to remain 
efficient in meeting the needs of consumers) and resources exhausted in seeking rents 
(monopolies are a textbook example of rent-seekers).
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 In the present context, what this 
translates into is, firstly, the new set of costs that would be created as the result of the 
Committee’s capture of all decision-making possibilities when it comes to enforcing the 
compatibility test under the Covenant; and, secondly, the new set of costs that would be created 
as the result of Committee’s rent-seeking behaviour.  
In the first situation, the most immediate risk is the return of the holdout scenario, but this 
time within the internal institutional setup of the Committee: all it would take to derail an 
otherwise quite possibly legitimate enforcement action would be to a handful of individuals. One 
does not even have to worry about any nefarious plans, undue political pressure, or personal self-
aggrandizement (although the proposed setup would certainly be vulnerable to all of these 
concerns). It is enough that there should arise a ‘simple’ well-intentioned ideological 
disagreement and one of the fractions thereafter starts to act strategically. People are stubborn, 
especially when the position they take is defended as a matter of principle. Now, suppose the 
holdout has not led to a complete breakdown of social cooperation but led either to a low-
intensity stalemate or a pattern of alternating capitulations (forced deals). There is a good chance 
that whatever enforcement decisions are made at this point would not be perfectly synched with 
the Covenant’s object and purpose. The very real risk this will result in is that there will either 
follow a pattern of ‘unnecessarily’ taken enforcement action (overzealous striking-down of 
suspect reservations) or there will be an ‘unnecessarily’ imposed reticence of enforcement 
(excessive tolerance). The former will carry a certain measure of ‘extra’ institutional costs; the 
latter will trigger a pattern of losses imposed on the ultimate beneficiaries of the Covenant – this 
is the foregone consumer surplus analogy – as the result of the undelivered or underdelivered 
protection to its object and purpose. Whenever the Committee fails to strike down a reservation 
that is otherwise legally impermissible, it will no longer be able to pass on the responsibility for 
encouraging in the respective State a policy of systematic neglect for human rights, i.e. for 
sponsoring, however unintentionally, mass-scale human rights violations.  The responsibility at 
least partially will lie at its feet, which in the long run will inevitably lead to a system-wide 
evisceration of trust in the general effectivity, validity, and legitimacy of the system.  The more 
entrenched, under these conditions, becomes the pattern of alternating capitulations, the more 
room there will be for the Committee to engage in the practice of ‘double standards’, the more 
pronounced, consequently, will become the evisceration of trust.
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 Add to this the costs that will 
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 The evisceration of trust will ensue even where there are no double standards. The key for trust-based 
legitimation systems is the preservation of direct continuity in expectations between the actor and their audience. Cf. 
Patricia Danzon, Comment on Epstein, 36 J. L. & Econ. 587, 593 (1993) (‘the single owner principle is 
unambiguous only in circumstances in which preferences are similar’). The introduction of the single-owner 
(monopoly of enforcement) approach in the case of the General Comment No. 24 system inevitably begs the 
be created in the process of effecting, denying, and dispelling rumours about the capture of the 
Committee by the various States and lobbying interests, not least the lost opportunities associated 
with expending all this energy and effort, and the classical effects of centralisation-induced 
inefficiencies are revealed in their full glory.  
Let there be no misunderstanding: most of these scenarios are exceedingly unrealistic and 
most of these threats exist only on the paper. But, as a matter of legal-regime-design dynamics, 
there certainly remains a case to be made for the idea that the reassignment of absolute property 
rights over appraisal and validation from the contracting parties to a centralised decision-making 
organ not only resolves the problem of the free rider but also resurrects the problem of the 
holdout under the rubrics of ‘bureaucratic rent-seeking’ and ‘capture by special interests’.  
Viewed from this angle, the structural relationship between the Committee’s vision and 
the doctrinal archive behind the modern law of reservations takes on the following form:  
 
 PAA 
 
 
UT 
 
 
 CTA 
           GC24 
 
 
 
 
c. General Conclusion 
 
 
On the basis of the aforegoing discussion, it seems possible to detect the following general 
pattern in the doctrinal genealogy of General Comment No. 24:  
 
(i) In the context of its relationship with the Vienna tradition, the Committee’s vision 
bespeaks an attempt to combine the decisive return to the objectivist sensibility and 
the push for a higher degree of administrability with some form of normative fealty to 
the substantive dimension of the Vienna regime.   
(ii) The vision behind the model solution outlined in General Comment No. 24 exhibits a 
strong affinity not only with the traditional compatibility test approach but also, albeit 
to a lesser degree, the unanimity theory. This affinity is particularly noticeable in the 
institutional dimension of the model.  
(iii) The model consistently rejects the logic of the Pan-American approach and, with it, the 
modernist/late-objectivist sensibility in its application to the modern law of treaties. 
(iv) Recalling the general parallel established earlier between the modernist sensibility and 
the move to the Baudrillardian logic of simulation (see Section 3j), it may be possible 
to read the moving initiative behind the Comment as part of the broader trend of, in 
Baudrillard’s language, representation attempting to absorb simulation in the law of 
voluntary obligations. The shadows of Darius and the conservative contract law 
movement tentatively emerge on the margins.  
                                                                                                                                                             
question of whose exact preferences as to what should be the acceptable level of exclusion or modification of the 
treaty’s provisions by the reservation in question, the policy line adopted by the single owner (the Committee) 
should reflect, if, as is to be expected, the respective parties’ (contracting States’) preferences are going to differ.  
  
CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR DOCTRINAL GENEALOGY 
 
The study of doctrinal genealogy can only reveal so much about legal history. However rich it 
may be in details, the account it generates about any given legal-historical event will always 
remain incomplete. Nor, in all fairness, would it be wise to expect otherwise. Every method has 
its limitations.  
The main strength of doctrinal genealogy – its capacity to zoom in on the internal logics 
of legal regimes, to take in the ‘inner life of the law’, as it were, in its basic legal-semiotic 
dimension – inevitably also constitutes the source of its main drawback. Like every intra-
disciplinary investigative enterprise, doctrinal genealogy suffers from a certain predilection for 
epistemological formalism and thus, by implication, legal fetishism. The concept of legal History 
it projects is essentially modelled on the traditional concept of intellectual History, which, as 
conventionally practised, far more often than not tends to become nothing more than a History of 
ideas simpliciter,
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 that is to say, a History of ideational constructs taken as objects-in-
themselves, serenely floating, godlike, in splendid isolation from whatever political, economic, 
or cultural contexts may have generated, shaped, or conditioned their development. Unless 
supplemented by methodological assumptions imported from other analytical traditions, the 
enterprise of international legal historiography built on the model of doctrinal genealogy runs, 
thus, the very real risk of recasting the history of international law as though it were some kind 
of a quasi-Hegelian process: a mystical march of ideas driven by the internal logic of conceptual 
interactions between abstract legal doctrines.  
Not that the proverbial grass has necessarily been any greener on the other side. Take, as 
an example, the typical methodological solution resorted to by most international law scholars 
writing about the history of international law today: international law is essentially made by 
States and, to some extent, international organisations; States and international organisations are 
political entities; everything they do is politics; hence, the key to any question of international 
legal history has to be sought in the history of ‘international politics’.  
At first sight, the notion of approaching the history of General Comment No. 24 in terms 
of a political conflict between the Human Rights Committee, the contracting parties, and the 
International Law Commission may seem intellectually rather attractive. It implies an essentially 
anti-determinist notion of history, which, of course, is always a ‘good thing’, unless one is an 
unreconstructed Stalinist or a religious fanatic. It allows one to recognise the cardinal importance 
of agency and contingency, while also driving home the allegedly critical point that law is, after 
all, a continuation of politics (by other means). Its analytical structures provide its users with a 
strong sense of intellectual immunity against any form of disciplinary solipsism, Hegelian 
mysticism, and legal fetishism. Its mode of explanation seems to be easily empiricisable, which 
means that its claims can always be subjected to the Popperian test of scientificity-as-
falsifiability. Last but not least, it seems to be relatively easy to research which means that it 
should also be relatively easy to write.  
All this is unquestionably important and one should certainly not deny the relevance of 
productive facility considerations. And yet even if any of the ‘breakthroughs’ listed above should 
still be considered a praiseworthy achievement at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the analytical 
costs this approach imposes on its users quite obviously outweigh all of its benefits.  
In the first place, this vision of legal history tends to reproduce the exact same set of 
flaws that every instrumentalist theory of law has been shown to suffer from in the last one 
hundred years since Hohfeld and Pashukanis: politicist monism, radical underappreciation of the 
constraining force of legal reasoning, absence of any ontological notion of the legal form, etc. By 
presenting international law as little more than a stage on which the game of international 
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politics is played out, it not only prevents the student of international law from learning how to 
recognise that which is specifically legal about international legal history, but also sets the 
enterprise of international legal studies as a whole a good several decades back by inducing it to 
‘forget’ that law is not only a medium (for the pursuit of politics) but also a site; that every site 
has its own ‘rules of gravity’; that even the most flexible medium tends, if not to ‘shape’, then at 
least to ‘filter’ the ‘message’, and so on and so forth.224   
In the second place, and much more importantly, instead of actually solving the 
aforementioned question of legal fetishism, it simply relegates it from the domain of legal 
concepts to that of institutional and political concepts. The evolution of legal ideas, theories, and 
doctrines, on this view of things, comes to be understood as a function of the history of 
international institutions and diplomatic interactions. But what exactly then determines the 
course of this latter set of events? Where does the causational impetus behind diplomatic history 
come from? Surely, the logic of international diplomacy cannot be self-generating. The more one 
thinks about it, the more the sense of the black-box approach becomes difficult to ignore.  
The downsides are only marginally less obvious if instead of a ‘political history’ one 
decides to write a ‘social history’ or opts for some form of the ‘international law as a collection 
of biographies’ project. Again, almost immediately one stumbles into the same problems of 
instrumentalism and relegation-instead-of-explanation mentioned earlier, with the added 
complication that, in the second case, one also runs the risk of erasing the generic boundary 
between history and hagiography. But, as Jack Schlegel so aptly reminds us, there is something 
else that is entirely new here too. The radical premise on which both of these modes of inquiry 
rest is that ‘social actions are intelligible preliterately’.225 That is to say, if one were to practice 
either of these enterprises in a methodologically coherent fashion, one would need to assume that 
the gravitation of different sectors of the ‘invisible college’ towards different projects (social 
history) and the making of professional life choices by various disciplinary luminaries 
(biographism) tend to happen completely independently not only of the discipline’s internal 
landscape of ideas but also the actual contents of the various  international legal regimes which 
the people in question worked for, with, despite, or against. An interesting hypothesis this may 
be to entertain, to be sure, but just how many international lawyers do you know who would 
actually fit this profile?  
Naturally, one could dispense with the ‘completely independently’ part in one way or 
another, or at least relax it enough to be able to introduce some form of ‘feedback effect’ 
qualification or a multiple causation thesis. But the further one moves down that slope, the more 
one risks slipping into the everything-is-a-cause-of-everything mode of reasoning, and once you 
become happy with that kind of holistic fuzzy mysticism, why bother doing any history at all?  
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Most importantly, by reducing the phenomenon of legal history to the history of social 
movements or the life-stories of disciplinary heroes, both of these approaches inevitably end up 
losing the concept of the legal-historical event itself. Whatever great unique insights they may 
enable its adherents to derive, they leave no theoretical space in which questions such as those 
raised in the course of this article can be raised. Put differently, one could write the history of the 
international human rights movement, or a history of the old guard of the International Law 
Commission, or a whole library of biographies of each of the Committee’s members and of the 
Commission’s special rapporteur who opposed the General Comment No. 24 so vigorously. But 
one could never even begin thinking about (let alone research or write) the history of General 
Comment No. 24 itself. 
None of this means, of course, that the best way forward is to accept that there is no best 
way forward, that no method is perfect, and that historical truth is therefore either completely 
inaccessible in principle or that ‘as always, the answer lies somewhere in the middle’. To 
subscribe to the former view would be a complete non sequitur. To endorse the latter would be to 
embrace the philosophy of principled relativism, and, at least in this context, to choose relativism 
as one’s methodological lodestar would seem to be a form of charlatanry.  
Not every ‘account’ has something valuable to contribute to the ‘conversation’. The 
answer to ‘what ended colonialism?’ is not ‘forty-two’. Some ‘stories’ are plain silly; others are 
almost certainly the product (and the cause) of large-scale mystifications. Still others tend to 
impose implicit theoretical frameworks that can as easily develop into useful cognitive 
instruments as they can turn into insurmountable epistemological blocks. For the study of the 
specifically legal component of any legal-historical event, so long as the main thrust of the 
inquiry remains limited to determining the legal meaning of the given event in its immediate 
context, doctrinal genealogy as a method of legal historiography has no equals. It has very little 
to offer its users when the analytical focus of the inquiry shifts (as it eventually must) to the 
exploration of the specifically historical aspect of that same event. For that, one must turn to 
other analytical traditions and methods.  
 
 
 
 
